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Articles
A New Hope: Tortious Interference
with an Expected Inheritance in
Rhode Island
Rebecca M. Murphy and Samantha M. Clarke*
INTRODUCTION

An extension of actions for interference with contractual
relations, tortious interference with an expected inheritance,
creates liability for a tortfeasor who intentionally prevents
another from receiving an inheritance, at-death benefit, or lifetime
gift. It is rooted in the concept that causes of action such as undue
influence and fraud, typically brought in the probate courts, may
be insufficient to provide a disinherited victim with a remedy, and
premised on the maxim that every wrong should have a remedy.1
Tortious interference with an expected inheritance or gift,
though by no means a recently developed cause of action, has
gained traction since its adoption by the Restatement (Second) of
* Rebecca M. Murphy, Associate Attorney, Pannone Lopes Devereaux &
O’Gara LLC; J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 2010; B.A.,
College of Holy Cross, 2006. Samantha M. Clarke, Associate Attorney,
Pannone Lopes Devereaux & O’Gara LLC; J.D., Roger Williams University
School of Law, 2014; B.A., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 2010.
1.
See Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 425 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Wellin v. Wellin, 135 F. Supp. 3d 502, 516–18 (D.S.C. 2015); see also R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person within this state ought to find a certain
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may
be received in one’s person, property, or character.”).
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Torts in 1979,2 and has received attention since the highly
publicized 2006 United States Supreme Court decision in
Marshall v. Marshall, perhaps better known as the Anna Nicole
Smith litigation.3 Currently, about half of the states acknowledge
the tort.4 Many of these states adopt the definition provided by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 774B (1979):
One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means
intentionally prevents another from receiving from a
third person an inheritance or gift that he would
otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other
for loss of the inheritance or gift.5
However, many of the states that recognize the tort only allow
a claim of tortious interference where an alternate remedy at law
(be it through the states’ probate code or otherwise) is unavailable
or would not provide the injured party with adequate relief.6
Thus, in those states tortious interference serves as a surrogate
claim in situations where a victim is unable to pursue a will
contest or action against an executor for recovery of wrongfully
diverted assets.7
Though the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to weigh in,
the tort was recently considered by the Rhode Island Superior
Court in Americans United for Life v. Legion of Christ of North
America, Inc., and determined to be a viable cause of action in
Rhode Island, albeit with the requirement that plaintiffs first
exhaust available alternative remedies, such as a will challenge in
probate court.8 This decision breaks new ground in Rhode Island
jurisprudence, creating a deterrent for wrongful conduct and,
consequently, providing greater protections to
vulnerable
members of the Rhode Island populace.
This Article will provide a comprehensive overview of tortious
2. Diane J. Klein, The Disappointed Heir’s Revenge, Southern Style:
Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with
Analysis of State Approaches in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 55 BAYLOR L.
REV. 79, 84–85 (2003).
3. See 547 U.S. 293 (2006).
4. See infra Part II.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
6. See infra Parts III, IV.
7. See id.
8. No. PC-2016-2900, 2017 WL 119569, at *8–9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4,
2017).
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interference with an expected inheritance. Part I discusses the
genesis and development of tortious or wrongful interference with
an expected inheritance. Part II surveys various states’ adoption
and rejection of the tort. Part III highlights differences in states’
approaches to the torts requirements as well as damages available
to victims, and discusses practical considerations, including
exhaustion of remedies and when parties may initiate the tort
action. Part IV discusses the Rhode Island Superior Court’s
decision in Americans United, whether the tort would be
recognized by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and provides
arguments in favor of rejecting the so-called exhaustion
requirement as an unnecessary and potentially impossible
prerequisite to maintaining a tortious interference claim in
superior court.
I.

GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH AN
EXPECTED INHERITANCE

A.

Background

A claim of tortious interference with an expected inheritance
or gift provides one with the opportunity to recover against a
tortfeasor for the wrongful deprivation of an expected inheritance,
benefit under a will, at-death benefit, or inter vivos gift outside of
probate court.9 The tort developed as a natural extension of other
common law commercial and non-commercial “interference” torts
such as interference with contract, interference with prospective
economic advantage, interference with prospective employment or
business relations, and interference with gift.10 All of these torts
are based on wrongful interference with an expectancy, and all
involve 1) economic loss without physical harm to person or
property; 2) a claim that is not based on an existing and
enforceable right or an existing and enforceable contract; and 3) a
probable prospect of economic gain.11
Tortious interference is rooted in the concept that traditional
9.
Irene D. Johnson, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of
Inheritance or Gift—Suggestions for Resort to the Tort, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 769,
770 (2008).
10. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42.1 (2d
ed. 2000).
11. See id.; Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (Or. 1999) (en banc).
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causes of action such as undue influence and fraud, often brought
in probate court in response to a petition to probate a will, may be
insufficient to provide a disinherited victim with a remedy, and
premised on the maxim that every wrong should have a remedy.12
Diane J. Klein, Professor at University of La Verne College of
Law, and nationally recognized contributor to tortious
interference scholarship, explains that “[t]he need for the tort is
most clearly demonstrated by situations in which the probate
court fails by its own standards—that is, when probate
proceedings cannot fully correct a wrongful attempt to frustrate
the testator’s desires.”13
When might probate proceedings lack the ability to remedy
wrongful attempts to frustrate a testator’s
intentions?
A
tortfeasor might unduly influence a testator to replace the name of
one beneficiary with that of the tortfeasor in a will or trust.14
However, even where a will contest on grounds of undue influence
is successful and a later executed will is denied probate, there is
no guarantee that the testator’s intended disposition will take the
contested will’s place.15 And even if the probate court declined to
probate the affected provision of the will, it would not restore the
gift or penalize the tortfeasor.16 Indeed, “[i]f the tortfeasor were a
residuary beneficiary, he might still benefit.”17
Also, “[t]he tortfeasor may use undue influence or fraud to
induce [a] donor to make inter vivos transfers that deplete the
estate . . . . [Where] the tortfeasor is the personal representative of
the estate, it is unlikely that the estate will attempt to recapture
such assets even if this were possible.”18 And, in this situation,
the personal representative may attempt to impede the victim’s
efforts to restore wrongfully transferred assets.19 Practically
12. See Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 425 N.E.2d 1187, (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Wellin v. Wellin, 135 F. Supp. 3d 502 (D.S.C. 2015).
13.
Diane J. Klein, A Disappointed Yankee in Connecticut (or Nearby)
Probate Court: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A
Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the First, Second, and Third
Circuits, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 247 (2004).
14.
Id. at 248.
15.
See id. at n.31.
16.
Id. at 248.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
See, e.g., id. at n.32 (quoting Alvin E. Evans, Torts to Expectancies in
Decedents’ Estates, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 187, 203–04 (1944)) (“Probate may be
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speaking:
[D]isappointed heirs may settle for considerably less than
they are entitled to receive in order to avoid dissipating
the estate through a lengthy and expensive will contest.
In these and other situations, a will contest simply does
not offer the disappointed person a way to obtain the
intended legacy, and may actually prevent it.20
Tortious interference is an in personam claim which may
result in a judgment against the wrongdoer to be paid from
personal assets, rather than from the testator’s probate estate,
whereas a will contest is an action in rem which “determines what
will happen to the assets in the testator’s probate estate.”21
Because prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and punitive
damages (in addition to compensatory damages) are available in
tort actions, an action alleging tortious interference threatens to
penalize wrongdoers.22 Therefore, unlike will contests which,
some argue, have no deterrent effect, tortious interference serves
as a powerful deterrent to those who would otherwise engage in
tortious conduct.23 To fill the vacuum left from inadequate
probate procedures, over the decades courts have recognized the
need to extend the common-law claim for tortious interference
with a business relation or contract to the context of inheritance
law.24
B. Development of the Tort
Though not officially dubbed tortious interference with an
expectation of inheritance until the Restatement (Second) of Torts
in 1979, the concept of obtaining redress for such tortious conduct
outside of probate court traces its roots back to the nineteenth
century.25 As early as 1855, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
impossible because the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of the proof
required to establish a will. This is a wrong involving the plaintiff’s loss of
evidence and a tort remedy should be available.”).
20.
Id. at 239.
21.
Johnson, supra note 9, at 772.
22.
Id. at 774.
23.
See id.
24.
See infra Part III.
25.
This section addresses the development tort but does not focus on
which states have expressly adopted it. For a discussion of the states that
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recognized that relief could be granted in a case alleging wrongful
interference in preventing a testator from creating a will.26 In
Kelly v. Kelly, the decedent’s attending physician had written a
will for him, which established the decedent’s wife as his sole
beneficiary.27 The required number of witnesses had been sent
for, but left before they witnessed the will.28 After the decedent’s
death, his widow filed suit against the decedent’s brother and his
mother, claiming that they prevented the witnesses from signing
the will by the use of threats and violence.29 The court dismissed
the widow’s case, citing a lack of evidence that threats and
violence were actually used, but nonetheless held that “[a]ctions of
this kind were admissible under the rules of the civil law . . . .”30
Less than twenty years later, in 1874, the Connecticut
Supreme Court decided Dowd v. Tucker.31 In Dowd, the decedent
made a will giving all of her property to her nephew.32 About two
weeks prior to her death, the decedent expressed her desire to
bequeath her interest in a house to her niece.33 The niece
prepared a codicil for the decedent’s signature.34 Before the
decedent signed the codicil, however, she asked to see her nephew
first so she could inform him about the property transfer and
receive his consent.35 In response, the nephew told the decedent
that she did not need to sign the codicil because she was weak,
and that he would deed the property to the niece as the decedent
wanted.36 After the death of the decedent, the niece demanded
that the nephew deed the decedent’s interest in the property to
her, but the nephew refused.37 The Supreme Court of Errors
characterized the nephew’s
actions
as
fraudulent.38 He
understood that the decedent’s intention was to bequeath her
have expressly adopted the tort, see infra Part II.
26. See Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622, 622–23 (1855).
27. Id. at 623.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 622.
30. Id.
31. 41 Conn. 197 (1874).
32. Id. at 204.
33. Id. at 203–04.
34. Id. at 202.
35. Id. at 203–04.
36. Id. at 205–06.
37. Id. at 204.
38. Id. at 203.
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interest in the property to her niece, and deceptively promised to
carry out her intention by deeding the property to the niece once
he received it from the decedent’s estate.39 The court agreed with
counsel for the niece that the nephew was a constructive trustee of
the property and that he was “bound in equity and
good
40
conscience to make the conveyance.”
Courts in the early twentieth century also recognized a need
to remedy tortious interference with an expected inheritance
beyond the confines of a will contest in probate court. In 1907, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Lewis v. Corbin.41
There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the executor and
residuary legatee, induced the testatrix to execute an invalid
codicil giving a sum of $5,000 to the plaintiff’s father.42
Unbeknownst to both the testatrix and the defendant, the
plaintiff’s father had died before the codicil was executed.43 The
plaintiff sued the defendant, and the Supreme Judicial Court
stated that while no action would lie during the life of the
testatrix, if “the fraud [was] operative up to the time of [the
testatrix’s] death . . . the fraud directly and proximately caused
the plaintiff’s loss of his legacy” and the action would lie.44
However, the Court granted the defendant’s demurrer since “the
pleading [was] defective in not averring facts which exclude[d]
the possibility that the testatrix changed her purpose in regard to
this legacy, and which show[ed] that the fraud continued
operative to the time of her death . . . .”45
In Barron v. Stuart, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized
the concept underpinning tortious interference and imposed a
constructive trust on the property that was the subject of the
interference.46 The testator’s son induced the testator to leave all
of his property to his wife, in his wife’s presence, promising that
she would divide it equally among the testator’s children and
39. Id. at 203–04.
40. Id. at 206.
41. 81 N.E. 248 (Mass. 1907).
42. Id. at 249.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 250.
45. Id. This requirement under Massachusetts law that the operative
fraud “continue” until a testator’s death is explored in greater detail in Part
III, infra.
46. 207 S.W. 22, 25 (Ark. 1918).
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grandchildren.47 After the testator died, his widow refused to
deed any of the testator’s timberlands to the testator’s daughters
or divide up the testator’s personal property equally between the
children.48 The testator’s daughters and grandchildren brought
suit in equity.49 The court found that the testator’s wife was held
as a constructive trustee for the intended beneficiaries since she
was guilty of fraud by acquiescence.50
In Creek v. Laski, the Michigan Supreme Court found tort
liability for destruction of a will, thereby defeating its terms.51
The defendant executrix destroyed a will because of her
dissatisfaction with its terms and four years later attempted to
have the destroyed will allowed at probate.52 At that hearing, the
plaintiff learned that the will bequeathed $2,000 to her, and she
became a party to the proceeding.53 The probate court denied the
claimed bequest because the plaintiff only had one witness testify
to it, and the governing statute required two witnesses.54 The
plaintiff thereafter brought suit in Michigan Superior Court; she
alleged malicious and fraudulent destruction of the will, which
prevented her from proving the gift and therefore defeating her
legacy.55 The defendant argued that the probate court decision
was res judicata of the plaintiff’s right to recover damages from
the executrix.56 The court disagreed holding that Michigan
probate courts have “no authority to invade the province of
common-law courts to award damages for torts, whether in
connection with wills or otherwise.”57
It bears noting the significance of the court’s decision in Creek
in recognizing the limited function of the probate courts.58 Merely
because an action concerns the execution of or, in that case, the
destruction of a will does not confine tort victims to the probate
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 25.
227 N.W. 817, 818–19 (Mich. 1929).
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.
See id.
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court forum.59 As Creek recognized, where an action sounds in
tort, it is the common-law courts that enjoy jurisdiction, ergo the
need for a cause of action to remedy victims of wrongful
interference with their inheritances.60
In Thomas v. Briggs, the plaintiff’s aunt prepared and signed
a will eight days before her death, leaving her residuary estate in
equal shares to the plaintiff and the aunt’s husband, the
defendant.61 After the will was prepared, the aunt asked the
defendant to have the will witnessed and finished, and the
defendant promised to do so, but never did.62 Thus, the plaintiff’s
aunt died intestate.63 The court held that in a constructive trust
case such as this, “[i]f one party obtains the legal title to
property, . . . by fraud[,] . . . violation of confidence[,] or . . . in any
other unconscientious manner, . . . equity . . . impress[es] a
constructive trust upon the property in favor of the one who is in
good conscience entitled to it.”64 The court continued:
[W]hen an heir or devisee in a will prevents the testator
from providing for one for whom he would have provided
but for the interference of the heir or devisee, such heir or
devisee will be deemed a trustee, by operation of law, of
the property, real or personal, received by him from the
testator’s estate, to the amount or extent that the
defrauded party would have received had not the
intention of the deceased been interfered with.65
The defendant’s interference prevented the decedent from
providing for the plaintiff, as she would have done, but for the
interference.66 Therefore, a constructive trust for the plaintiff
resulted.67
59. See id.
60. See id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing differences between probate
court proceedings and actions in superior court when alleging tortious
interference with an expected inheritance).
61. 189 N.E. 389, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1934) (en banc).
62. Id. at 391.
63. Id. at 389, 391.
64. Id. at 392 (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., POMEROY’S EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES: A TREATISE OF EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 155 (3d ed. 1905)).
65. Id. (quoting Ransdel v. Moore, 53 N.E. 767, 771 (Ind. 1899)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 393.
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Thomas is illustrative of situations in which, as cautioned by
Diane Klein, probate courts fail by their own standards.68 The
will, which contained legitimate bequests the testator expected to
be probated, was never formally executed, and was thereby
invalid.69 No probate proceeding, will challenge, or otherwise
could vindicate the plaintiff’s rights.70 Tortious interference,
however, which does not rely upon the probate or revocation of a
will, could fill the vacuum left by the probate court and impose
damages against the tortfeasor’s assets in the amount of money
that the plaintiff would have received but for the interference,
thereby making the plaintiff whole.71
Approximately two years after Thomas, the North Carolina
Supreme Court recognized tortious interference in Bohannon v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.72 There, the plaintiff alleged that his
grandmother and aunt had by false representations changed his
grandfather’s “fixed intention” to leave a large share of his estate
to the plaintiff.73 Denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the
court held that the plaintiff’s allegations supported a cause of
action.74 It reasoned that “[i]f the plaintiff can recover against the
defendant for the malicious and wrongful interference with the
making of a contract, we see no good reason why he cannot recover
for the malicious and wrongful interference with the making of a
will.”75 The court therefore extended the common law claim of
tortious interference with a contract to the context of inheritance
cases:
Would not a man have the right to receive gifts or
insurance or the like, if they were in process of being
perfected, and would have come to him but for malicious
and fraudulent interference? A bare possibility may not
be within the reason for this position. But where an
intending donor, or testator, or member of a benefit
68. See id.; Klein, supra note 13, at 247.
69. See Thomas, 189 N.E. at 391.
70. See id. at 393.
71. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill. 2009) (“The
‘widely recognized’ tort does not contest the validity of the will; it is a
personal action directed at an individual tortfeasor.”).
72. 188 S.E. 390, 394 (N.C. 1936).
73. Id. at 393.
74. Id. at 394.
75. Id.
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society, has actually taken steps toward perfecting the
gift, or devise, or benefit, so that if let alone the right of
the donee, devisee, or beneficiary will cease to be inchoate
and become perfect, we are of the opinion that there is
such a status that an action will lie, if it is maliciously
and fraudulently destroyed, and the benefit diverted to
the person so acting, thus occasioning loss to the person
who would have received it.76
In 1939, Section 870 of the Restatement (First) of Torts
foretold the official recognition of the tort, providing that “[a]
person who does any tortious act for the purpose of causing harm
to another or to his things or to the pecuniary interests of another
is liable to the other for such harm if it results.”77
The
Restatement further elaborated that “[t]he rule also applies to
allow recovery where the plaintiff has been prevented from
receiving a gift from a third person.”78 Finally, in 1979, after
decades of jurisprudence on the subject, Section 774B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts formally acknowledged tortious
interference as a cause of action.79 Section 774B provides: “One
who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally
prevents another from receiving from a third person an
inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is
subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”80
Since 1979, many states have recognized tortious
interference.81
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court
identified tortious interference as a “widely recognized tort,”82
and, while studies vary and commentators disagree, it has been
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
78. Id. § 870 cmt. b.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
80. Id. The most recent American Law Reports annotation on the
subject identifies five elements of the tort: “[T]he existence of the expectancy;
that the defendant intentionally interfered with the expectancy; that the
interference involved tortious conduct such as fraud, duress, or undue
influence; that there was a reasonable certainty that the plaintiff would have
received the expectancy but for the defendant’s interference; and
damages . . . .” Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Liability in Damages for
Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift, 22 A.L.R. 4th 1229, § 2 (1983).
81. See infra Part II.
82. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 312 (2006) (citing King v. Acker,
725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1987)).
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estimated that about half of the states have case law recognizing
the tort.83
However, it bears noting that tortious interference with an
expected inheritance is not without its critics. Some legal scholars
worry that tortious interference is redundant to will contests, for
it creates a “rival legal regime” for addressing the same problems
and invites litigation, since tort actions are governed by less
stringent procedures.84 For example, while a will contest is
subject to an onerous standard of proof, tort actions may be proved
merely by a preponderance of the evidence.85 Another concern
about the tort is that it corrodes inheritance law, which is founded
on the principle that property owners have the freedom to dispose
of their property as they please, and that the American justice
system should not question the wisdom of such dispositions, nor
rewrite estate plans posthumously.86 Since inheritance law
centers on effectuating the intentions of the testator, it does not
provide a would-be-beneficiary with redress for a third party’s
tortious interference with the expected inheritance.87 On the
other hand, critics complain that tortious interference focuses not
on the testator, but on the allegedly injured would-be-beneficiary,
thereby undermining the organizing principle of inheritance
law.88
Recognizing the potential overlap between tortious
interference and will contests, many states have adopted a
requirement that litigants first pursue probate court remedies
83. See Devlin v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 540 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting
most states that decided the issue have recognized tortious interference with
expected inheritance as valid cause of action); John C.P. Goldberg & Robert
H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with
Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 361 (2013) (reporting that tortious
interference with expected inheritance has now been accepted in twenty-one
states); Klein, supra note 13, at 240 n.10 (“[J]ust fewer than half of the states
recognize it, while about a quarter have no reported cases addressing it.”).
84. See, e.g., Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 338–39.
85. Johnson, supra note 9, at 773.
86. See, e.g., Diane J. Klein, Revenge of the Disappointed Heir: Tortious
Interference with Expectation of Inheritance–A Survey with Analysis of State
Approaches in the Fourth Circuit, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (2002) (“The
tort remedy permits a court of general jurisdiction to render judgments that
redistribute estate assets and undermine the finality of probated wills, albeit
in substance if not in form.”).
87. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 772.
88. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 86, at 271–72.
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before gaining entrance to non-probate courts. This “exhaustion”
requirement will be discussed in detail in Parts III and IV.
II. STATES ADOPTING AND REJECTING THE TORT

Commentators disagree on the number of states that have
recognized tortious interference.89 The divergence arises from the
variety of answers to a basic question: What does it mean for a
state to have “recognized” the tort? Responses range from
acknowledgment of tortious interference by the lower courts in one
state,90 to recognition by an appellate court in another,91 to
speculation by a federal court deciding state law in yet another.92
89. Compare Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361–62
(distinguishing among states where the “court of last resort has recognized
the tort,” states where “an intermediate appellate court has recognized it,”
and states where “the viability of the tort is an open question”) and James A.
Fassold, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of Inheritance: New Tort, New
Traps, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 2000, at 26 n.2 (compiling cases and acknowledging
that states have recognized the tort “to varying degrees”), with Rachel A. Orr,
Intentional Interference with an Expected Inheritance: The Only Valid
Expectancy for Arkansas Heirs is to Expect Nothing, 64 ARK. L. REV. 747, 750
(2011) (“[Tortious interference] is now recognized in twenty-five jurisdictions
throughout the country.”); Jared S. Renfroe, Does Tennessee Need Another
Tort? The Disappointed Heir in Tennessee and Tortious Interference with
Expectancy of Inheritance or Gift, 77 TENN. L. REV. 385, 393 (2010) (“Almost a
majority of the states recognize the tort.”); Diane J. Klein, “Go West,
Disappointed Heir”: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A
Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the Pacific States, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 209, 210 (2009) (“Twenty-five of the forty-two states that have
considered [tortious interference] have validated it.”); and Johnson, supra
note 9, at 774 (“[A]bout half of all jurisdictions do permit actions based on the
tort.”).
90. See Renfroe, supra note 89, at 393, 394 n.89 (including Connecticut as
a state “recogniz[ing] the tort as a cause of action” based upon two
Connecticut Superior Court decisions, but acknowledging that a third
Connecticut Superior Court decision states that Connecticut had not
recognized tortious interference); see also Klein, supra note 89, at 210 n.3
(same).
91. See Renfroe, supra note 89, at 393, 394 n.94 (including Indiana as a
state “recogniz[ing] the tort as a cause of action” based upon a decision by
Indiana’s Court of Appeals, its second-highest court); see also Klein, supra
note 89, at 210 n.3 (citing decision by Indiana’s Court of Appeals, its secondhighest court, in support of proposition that Indiana is a state that has
“validated” tortious interference).
92. See, e.g., Renfroe, supra note 89, at 395 n.108 (quoting Umsted v.
Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006)) (“We find that Rhode Island would
adopt the majority position that a cause of action for tortious interference
with an expectancy of inheritance . . . would not lie where an adequate
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Employing such broad definitions encourages analysis of the wide
variety of approaches to tortious interference. However, a broad
definition can also distort the landscape by inflating the number
of states whose courts have taken the step of formally recognizing
the tort.93 In order to avoid the aforementioned problem, this
Article employs explicit recognition by the highest court in the
state as its criteria. This distinction is made, not to avoid analysis
of other states’ examination of the tort, but to appropriately
distinguish between those states whose pronouncements on
tortious interference are binding law in their respective
jurisdictions and those states whose examination of the tort
remains merely advisory. Moreover, this Article will look closely
at whether the tort still exists in states where the highest courts’
subsequent decisions have meaningfully modified their tortious
interference jurisprudence.
A.

States Definitively Recognizing Tortious Interference

Ten states have definitively recognized tortious interference
through a decision in their court of last resort:94 Florida,95
Georgia,96 Illinois,97 Iowa,98 Maine,99 Massachusetts,100 North
statutory remedy is available but has not been pursued.”).
93. Klein, supra note 13, at 252 (“Strictly speaking . . . a state should
only be said to ‘recognize’ the tort if the state court of last resort (typically
called the supreme court) has said it does.”).
94. In setting the number of states that have adopted tortious
interference at ten, this Article reaches a different conclusion even from
commentators who distinguish between states that have adopted tortious
interference by decisions of their highest court and states where the tort has
merely been acknowledged by lower courts. See, e.g., Goldberg & Sitkoff,
supra note 83, at 361 (“In eleven states, the court of last resort has recognized
the tort . . . .” (emphasis added)). This distinction lies in the narrow criteria
for adoption employed in this Article, requiring a decision by a state’s court of
last resort without any subsequent decision modifying the prior holding in a
meaningful way. Specifically, the authors disagree about whether Kentucky
still recognizes tortious interference.
95. DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981) (“[A] cause of action
for wrongful interference with a testamentary expectancy has been
recognized in this state . . . .”); see also Klein, supra note 2, at 109–21
(discussing Florida’s “extremely well-developed body of law” on tortious
interference).
96. Mitchell v. Langley, 85 S.E. 1050, 1053 (Ga. 1915) (“[W]here an
intending donor, or testator, or member of a benefit society, has actually
taken steps toward perfecting the gift, or devise, or benefit, so that if let alone
the right of the donee, devisee, or beneficiary will cease to be inchoate and

2017]

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE & INHERITANCE

545

become perfect, we are of the opinion that there is such a status that an
action will lie, if it is maliciously and fraudulently destroyed, and the benefit
diverted to the person so acting, thus occasioning loss to the person who
would have received it.”); see also Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless,
Inc. v. Ichthus Cmty. Tr., 780 S.E.2d 311, 319 (Ga. 2015) (“Georgia’s
appellate courts have recognized a cause of action for interference with an
economic expectancy in the form of a gift within the context of receiving an
inheritance or otherwise receiving a benefit upon the death of another . . . .”);
Morgan v. Morgan, 347 S.E.2d 595, 595–96 (Ga. 1985) (reiterating Mitchell
holding); Renfroe, supra note 89, at 130 n.11 (citing Mitchell as recognizing
tort); Klein, supra note 2, at 121 (“Georgia was one of the very first states to
recognize the tort.”).
97. In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill. 2009) (acknowledging
tort and describing its elements); Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 &
n.175 (citing In re Estate of Ellis as recognizing tort); but see Robinson v.
First State Bank of Monticello, 454 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Ill. 1983) (“In this case,
where a will has been admitted to probate and where the plaintiffs have
engaged an attorney to determine whether they should file a will contest,
have decided not to contest the will, have entered into a settlement
agreement for $125,000 (agreeing to release the other parties to the
agreement including defendant . . . from any and all claims and causes of
action arising from any will, codicil or other undertaking by the parties), and
have allowed the statutorily prescribed period in which to contest the will to
expire (thereby establishing the validity of the will), we will not recognize a
tort action for intentional interference with inheritance.”); Jason L.
Hortenstine, The Tortious Loss of Expectancies, a Lost Opportunity for
Deterrence, and the Light at the End of the Tunnel, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 741, 741
(2013) (“In Illinois, courts recognize the tort as a last recourse, not as a
separate course of action.”). For purposes of this Article, it is apparent that
the state’s highest court has, at minimum, recognized the tort. See In re
Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d at 241; Robinson, 454 N.E.2d at 293–94.
98. Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1978) (“[W]e
are persuaded that an independent cause of action for the wrongful
interference with a bequest does exist, recognizing as we do the difficulties
attendant to recovery in such an action.”); see also Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d
518, 520 (Iowa 1992) (citing Frohwein as recognizing tort); Goldberg &
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 & n.175 (citing both Huffey and Frohwein as
recognizing tort).
99. Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1979) (“[U]nder appropriate
circumstances Maine recognizes an action for the wrongful interference with
an expected legacy or gift under a will.”); Klein, supra note 2, at 253 (“Maine
first recognized the tort in the 1979 case of Cyr v. Cote.”); see also Plimpton v.
Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 885 (Me. 1995) (citing Cyr as recognizing tort);
DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 843 (Me. 1995) (same); Harmon v.
Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Me. 1979) (same).
100. Lewis v. Corbin, 81 N.E. 248, 250 (Mass. 1907) (acknowledging that
defendant’s fraudulent conduct in inducing testatrix to execute codicil to her
will, and thereby depriving plaintiff of legacy under testatrix’s will,
constituted “actionable wrong”); see also Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d
1253, 1255 (Mass. 1997) (“[W]e have long recognized a cause of action for
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Carolina,101 Ohio,102 Oregon,103 and West Virginia.104 In each of
these states, (1) the highest court has definitively recognized
tortious interference, in some cases nearly a century ago; and (2)
those decisions remain binding authority on which lower courts in
tortious interference with the expectancy of receiving a gift in certain limited
conditions.”); Monach v. Koslowski, 78 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Mass. 1948) (recognizing
a sufficient cause of action for tortious interference with expected
inheritance); Klein, supra note 13, at 264 (“Massachusetts was one of the first
states to recognize the tort . . . .”).
101. Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 188 S.E. 390, 394 (N.C. 1936)
(“If the plaintiff can recover against the defendant for the malicious and
wrongful interference with the making of a contract, we see no good reason
why he cannot recover for the malicious and wrongful interference with the
making of a will.”); Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 356–57, 366
(discussing North Carolina’s recognition of tortious interference with
expected inheritance and later acknowledging Bohannan as “perhaps the
first case formally to recognize” the tort); Klein, supra note 86, at 273 (“North
Carolina was one of the first states in the entire United States to recognize
[the] tort.”); see also Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689, 690 (N.C. 1916) (allowing
plaintiff to proceed with tort action against individuals who destroyed
subsequent will that would have left plaintiff a legacy in testator’s estate in
order to probate prior will); but see Holt v. Holt, 61 S.E.2d 448, 451 (N.C.
1950) (“[A] child has no standing at law or in equity either before or after the
death of his parent to attack a conveyance by the parent as being without
consideration, or in deprivation of his right of inheritance.”).
102. Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ohio 1993) (citing
Morton v. Petitt, 177 N.E. 591, 592–93 (Ohio 1931)) (responding
in
affirmative to certified question from United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit as to whether Ohio recognizes tortious interference with
expectancy of inheritance); see also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361
& n.175 (citing Firestone as recognizing tort).
103. Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 206 (Or. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]here is no
need, in the case before us, to decide in the abstract whether to recognize a
separate and distinct claim for intentional interference with prospective
inheritance in this state. We hold that the complaint in the present case
states a claim under a reasonable extension of the scope of the tort of
intentional interference with economic relations.”); see also Goldberg &
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 & n.175 (citing Allen as recognizing tort); Klein,
supra note 89, at 214–15 (quoting Allen, 974 P.2d at 206) (“[T]he Oregon
Supreme Court expressly validated a cause of action for interference with
expectation of inheritance, albeit not as ‘a separate and distinct claim,’ but
rather ‘under a reasonable extension of the scope of the tort of intentional
interference with economic relations.’”).
104. Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260, 264 (W. Va. 1982) (“We find
tortious interference with a testamentary bequest to be a tort in West
Virginia.”); Klein, supra note 13, at 282 (“West Virginia recognizes the tort
and permits broad access to it.”); see also Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720,
763 (W. Va. 1998) (citing Barone as recognizing tort); Calacino v.
McCutcheon, 356 S.E.2d 23, 25–26 (W. Va. 1987) (same).
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those jurisdictions still rely. However, this is a two-part
requirement for a reason: While more than ten states’ highest
courts have examined the question of whether to adopt tortious
interference, the tort has not always survived as a viable cause of
action in the years that followed those initial decisions. For
example, in Kentucky,105 Idaho,106 and Delaware,107 the court of
last resort appeared to favor recognition of tortious interference,
but later cases strongly suggest that those earlier decisions are no
longer good law.
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that only a few
states recognize, in decisions that are binding authority within
their jurisdiction, a cause of action for tortious interference. It is
useful to distinguish and separately note these states, because
their decisions on tortious interference should ring with greater
force in any analysis of the tort. Cases from those jurisdictions
represent seasoned authority on the subject of tortious
interference. Several of these states have recognized the tort for
105. See Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 197 S.W.2d 424, 426–27 (Ky. 1946)
(recognizing a tort action for wrongful destruction of a will); but see Simmons
v. Simmons, No. 2012-CA-000383-MR, 2013 WL 3369421, at *23 (Ky. Ct.
App. July 5, 2013) (“We agree that while Kentucky has never overtly
recognized and adopted this cause of action, neither has it been rejected.”).
106. See Carter v. Carter, 146 P.3d 639, 647 (Idaho 2006) (adopting trial
court’s analysis of tortious interference in its review on appeal and appearing
to treat the tort as a viable cause of action); but see Losser v. Bradstreet, 183
P.3d 758, 764 (Idaho 2008) (discussing tortious interference in a manner
indicating the tort has not yet been recognized in Idaho, and thereafter
stating that it would assume, “without deciding, that this Court would
recognize the tort of interference with inheritance”) (emphasis added); see
also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 n.176.
107. See Chambers v. Kane, 424 A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(acknowledging the potential for, but “pass[ing] no judgment on whether or
not plaintiff may have a present cause of action, in tort, for the recovery of
money damages against her brother for his alleged tortious interference with
her expectation of receiving an inheritance from her mother”), aff’d in
pertinent part by 437 A.2d 163, 164 (Del. 1981) (“[T]o the extent that plaintiff
seeks an independent or personal judgment against her brother on the basis
of the allegations in the complaint, we are satisfied that the Vice Chancellor
made the correct ruling and, to that extent, the judgment will be affirmed.”);
but see Moore v. Graybeal, 550 A.2d 35, 35 (Del. 1988) (order) (“We agree with
the Superior Court, and the federal courts which have considered the issue,
that appellants’ claim of tortious interference with an inheritance if pursued
in a court of law would constitute a collateral attack upon the probate of the
will of [decedent]. Such an attack is clearly precluded by Delaware law.”);
Klein, supra note 2, at 286–91.
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many years:108 Florida, with its “extremely well-developed body
of law” on tortious interference,109 has cases dating back over fifty
years,110 and Maine, with cases dating back at least thirty-eight
years, boasts a whopping nine Supreme Judicial Court decisions
concerning the tort.111 However, even those states’ bodies of case
law on tortious interference are relatively young compared to
North Carolina (over eighty years),112 Georgia (over one hundred
years),113 and Massachusetts (over one hundred and ten years).114
In short, while the ten states whose highest courts have
definitively recognized the tort are not the sum total of authority
on tortious interference, their decisions carry considerable weight
in this Article’s examination of the tort.
B. States Acknowledging Without Explicitly Adopting the Tort
Another seventeen states, along with the District
of
Columbia, have not been silent on tortious interference:
California,115 Connecticut,116 Delaware,117 Idaho,118 Indiana,119
108. Accord Orr, supra note 89, at 750 (“The tort of intentional
interference with an expected inheritance has a history that spans more than
one hundred years in the United States court system.”); but see Goldberg &
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 355 (“As late as 1979, there was little recognition in
American law of wrongful interference with inheritance as a tort.”).
109. Klein, supra note 2, at 109.
110. See Allen, 197 S.W.2d at 424.
111. Klein, supra note 13, at 253.
112. See Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 188 S.E. 390, 394
(N.C. 1936).
113. See Mitchell v. Langley, 85 S.E. 1050, 1053 (Ga. 1915).
114. See Lewis v. Corbin, 81 N.E. 248, 250 (Mass. 1907).
115. See Beckwith v. Dahl, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 155–57 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (recognizing intentional interference with expectation of inheritance as
a valid cause of action); but see In re Estate of Trevillian, Nos. B187871,
B188103, 2008 WL 175933, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2008) (“The tort of
interference with the right to inherit has not been recognized in California.”);
Klein, supra note 89, at 220–28 (including California in analysis of “Pacific
states [that] have declined to recognize the tort”).
116. See Bria v. Saumell, No. 26 84 56, 1990 WL 271047, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 29, 1990) (indicating that “[t]here is authority for the
proposition that the plaintiffs have the right to maintain an action for
damages”) (citing Liability for Damages for Interference with Expected
Inheritance or Gift, 22 A.L.R 4th 1229, §§ 4, 6(a)); but see Troy v. Folger, No.
CV 970161947S, 1998 WL 252355, at *1–2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1998)
(granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss a count for “interference with
prospective advantage” premised upon the defendant’s interference with the
plaintiffs’ expectation of an inheritance from their father); see also Klein,
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Minnesota,123

supra note 13, at 271–73. Federal courts have offered similarly contradictory
opinions on whether Connecticut recognizes tortious interference. Compare
Devlin v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 542 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Connecticut
follows the majority of jurisdictions . . . in recognizing the tort of interference
with an inheritance.”), with DiMaria v. Silvester, 89 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196 n.2
(D. Conn. 1999) (concluding that “Connecticut does not recognize a cause of
action for the intentional interference with an inheritance”).
117. See Klein, supra note 13, at 286–91; see also Chambers v. Kane, 424
A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1980), aff’d in pertinent part by 437 A.2d at 164; but
see Moore v. Graybeal, 550 A.2d 35, 35 (Del. 1988) (order).
118. See Diane J. Klein, River Deep, Mountain High, Heir Disappointed:
Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with
Analysis of State Approaches in the Mountain States, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 7–8
(2008–2009) (“The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed tortious interference
with expectation of inheritance twice in just the past few years. While the
first case seems clearly to recognize it, the second casts some doubt on that
holding.”); Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 n.176; see also Carter v.
Carter, 146 P.3d 639, 647 (Idaho 2006); but see Losser v. Bradstreet, 183 P.3d
758, 764 (Idaho 2008).
119. See Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(adopting tortious interference with the limitation that parties are prohibited
from bringing the tort “where the remedy of a will contest is available and
would provide the injured party with adequate relief”); see also Carlson v.
Warren, 878 N.E.2d 844, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“To prevail on a claim of
tortious interference with an inheritance, [the plaintiffs] must show that the
[defendants] intentionally prevented them, by using fraud or other tortious
means, from receiving an inheritance from [the decedent] that they otherwise
would have received.”).
120. Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 197 S.W.2d 424, 426–27 (Ky. 1946); Simmons v.
Simmons, No. 2012-CA-000383-MR, 2013 WL 3369421, at *23
(Ky. Ct. App. July 5, 2013).
121. Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622, 622 (1855) (acknowledging possibility
of claim very similar to tortious interference that would permit a plaintiff to
obtain damages from defendants, where defendants allegedly “prevented
[decedent] by their threats and violence from instituting [plaintiff as
decedent’s] universal legatee”); see also Klein, supra note 2, at 105–09 (“No
Louisiana state court in the past century and a half has explicitly addressed
whether to recognize the tort of intentional interference with expectation of
inheritance as such[.]”) (emphasis added). McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F.
Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951), a federal case, is also occasionally cited as a case
establishing that Louisiana recognizes tortious interference. See Goldberg &
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362 n.185 (stating that while McGregor “fail[s] to
state whether [it is] applying Colorado or Louisiana law,” the case does
declare that “courts generally approve of the tort”); but see Klein, supra note
2, at 108 (discussing the same, but concluding “[i]t is more logical to assume
that Louisiana law is being applied throughout”).
122. See Estate of Doyle v. Doyle, 442 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (acknowledging that plaintiff had standing to bring claims against
defendants who allegedly, through undue influence, interfered with the
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Missouri,124 New

Jersey,125 New

Mexico,126 Pennsylvania,127

decedent’s testamentary plan to divide her estate equally between her two
children: the plaintiff and one of the defendants) (citing Harmon v. Harmon,
404 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1979)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW
INST. 1979); Liability in Damages for Interference with Expected Inheritance
or Gift, 22 A.L.R. 4th 1229).
123. See Botcher v. Botcher, No. CX-00-1287, 2001 WL 96147, at *6
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2001) (observing that creating new torts is a function
of the highest court and further declining to recognize tortious interference
where the remedies available to the appellant under the probate code were
“adequate to protect any interest he has in [the decedent’s] estate”).
124. See Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253, 256–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(examining authority concerning tortious interference and ultimately
recognizing the tort by acknowledging that a trust beneficiary has a valid
cause of action against a tortfeasor who induces a settlor to revoke the trust,
and in so doing, diverts trust funds and prevents the beneficiary, “from
receiving that which he would otherwise have received”); see also Commerce
Bank, N.A. v. Blasdel, 141 S.W.3d 434, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“Actions for
tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or gift under § 774B were
first recognized as viable in Missouri in Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988).”).
125. See Garruto v. Cannici, 936 A.2d 1015, 1018 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2007) (“[A]lthough an independent cause of action for tortious
interference with an expected inheritance may be recognized in other
circumstances, it is barred when, as here, plaintiffs have failed to pursue
their adequate remedy in probate proceedings of which they received timely
notice.”); see also Casternovia v. Casternovia, 197 A.2d 406, 409 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1964) (acknowledging that at that time, there was “no reported
decision in [New Jersey] wherein damages were sought to be recovered in a
tort action for malicious interference with an expected gift” but opening door
to possibility of cause of action); Klein, supra note 13, at 273–74 (“A single
New Jersey appellate case appears to recognize the tort, in dicta, although
not if the donor is still alive.”).
126. See Doughty v. Morris, 871 P.2d 380, 383 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)
(“Today, we extend the line of New Mexico cases acknowledging tortious
interference causes of action to include a cause of action against those who
intentionally and tortiously interfere with an expected inheritance.”); see also
Peralta v. Peralta, 131 P.3d 81, 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005); Klein, supra note
119, at 11 (“Although the Supreme Court of New Mexico has yet to address
the tort, three New Mexico Court of Appeals cases have recognized it and
begun to develop a state jurisprudence on the tort.”).
127. See Cardenas v. Schober, 783 A.2d 317, 325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)
(asserting that Pennsylvania permits an action for tortious interference)
(citing Marshall v. De Haven, 58 A. 141, 142 (Pa. 1904) (concluding that no
cause of action lay where plaintiff failed to alleged that purported tortfeasor
“was to, or did, use any fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence; that he
was successful in preventing any change [to the will]; that but for him the
testator would have changed his will, or that if the testator had done so what
he would have given to the plaintiff”)); see also McNeil v. Jordan, 814 A.2d
234, 238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (acknowledging tortious interference in a
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Rhode Island,128 Texas,129 Wisconsin,130 and the District of
Columbia131 offer lower court and appellate court decisions
examining and even outright embracing the tort, and decisions
from courts of last resort that simply discuss the tort while
declining to explicitly adopt it. The temptation may be to draw
expansive conclusions about the state of tortious interference from
the decisions in these jurisdictions, but it is a messy landscape
that does not lend itself to neatly packaged principles of law. As
will be addressed in Part III, there are distinctions even among
courts in the same state as to the proper approach to tortious
interference. These lingering disagreements have a troubling
result in jurisdictions without a decision by the highest court:
many aspects of the tort, including the elements of tortious
manner similar to Cardenas), rev’d on other grounds, 894 A.2d 1260, 1262
(Pa. 2006) (discussing pre-complaint discovery procedures and, notably, not
rejecting tortious interference); Klein, supra note 13, at 275 (describing the
sole Pennsylvania cases to recognize the tort as lower court cases).
128. See Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A.
No. PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 23 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (holding that
“tortious interference with expectation of inheritance is a cognizable claim
under Rhode Island law”). The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has also projected that the Rhode Island Supreme Court will
recognize the tort. See Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006)
(“We find that Rhode Island would adopt the majority position that a cause of
action for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance, if it lies at
all, would not lie where an adequate statutory remedy is available but has
not been pursued.”); Klein, supra note 13, at 292–93.
129. Compare King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1987) (“We
hold that a cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance rights
exists in Texas.”), with Anderson v. Archer, 490 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Tex. App.
2016) (observing that neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the state
legislature has recognized the tort, and therefore declining to recognize the
tort at the intermediate appellate level). See also Klein, supra note 2, at 97
(“Texas appellate courts recognize the tort . . . although the Texas Supreme
Court has yet to address it.”).
130. See Harris v. Kritzik, 480 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
(adopting Restatement formulation of tortious interference and concluding
that the complaint failed “to state a basis for which relief can be granted for
intentional or malicious interference with [an] expected inheritance”).
131. See In re Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d 672, 699–700 (D.C. 2008)
(analyzing tortious interference claim without deciding whether D.C.
recognizes the tort and concluding that claimant failed to “satisfy[y] her
burden as to all of the elements of that tort”); see also In re Estate of Reilly,
933 A.2d 830, 834 (D.C. 2007) (recounting without comment lower court
decision, which held that “the District of Columbia does not recognize the tort
of intentional interference with inheritance”).
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interference, courts with jurisdiction over the cause of action, and
whether probate remedies must be exhausted before pursing it,
remain open questions. Accordingly, while this Article will draw
from the foregoing body of law, it will do so with great caution.
C. States Declining to Recognize the Tort
With tortious interference on their dockets, the highest courts
in nine states have declined to recognize tortious interference:
Alabama,132 Arkansas,133 Kansas,134 Maryland,135 Montana,136
132. See Ex parte Batchelor, 803 So. 2d 515, 515 (Ala. 2001) (following
rehearing, withdrawing earlier opinion recognizing tortious interference). In
a case predating Batchelor, the Alabama Supreme Court had analyzed
tortious interference and noted the court had “not addressed the proposed
cause of action” before, but it concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a
claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Holt v. First Nat. Bank of
Mobile, 418 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1982). See also Klein, supra note 2, at 131
(“As matters currently stand . . . the tort is not recognized, although it has
substantial support from Alabama’s highest court.”).
133. See Jackson v. Kelly, 44 S.W.3d 328, 328 (Ark. 2001) (“We decline to
recognize the tort in this case because the appellant’s remedy in probate
court would have been adequate had she prevailed in her will contest.”); see
also Fenton v. Pearson, No. CA03-1122, 2004 WL 2101994, at *2 (Ark. Ct.
App. Sept. 22, 2004) (acknowledging that Arkansas “has yet to decide”
whether to adopt tortious interference, but determining that “even if the
cause of action were recognized, appellant could not prove an essential
element” thereof); Orr, supra note 89, at 747 (“To date, the Arkansas
legislature and Arkansas courts have not seen fit to recognize the tort of
intentional interference with an expected inheritance.”).
134. See Axe v. Wilson, 96 P.2d 880, 888 (Kan. 1939) (concluding that the
plaintiff’s action for damages, premised on “malicious interference with her
alleged right of inheritance,” would negate the effect of the operative will—
just as in a will contest—and as a result, holding that “remedy to obtain the
particular relief sought does not lie in an action for damages, but in her
action to contest the will”); but see Miller v. Woodmen Acc. & Life Ins. Co.,
961 P.2d 71 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished) (“[N]o such tort has been
previously recognized, [but] this cause of action has not been precluded when
the claimant has no other method by which to recover damages for undue
influence.”).
135. Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 661 A.2d 726, 728 (Md. 1995) (observing
that Maryland has “not yet considered expanding the tort to apply to
interference with gifts or bequests” and ultimately electing not to opine on
whether to “embrace” tortious interference because plaintiff failed to
adequately allege underlying tortious conduct of undue influence); Geduldig
v. Posner, 743 A.2d 247, 256 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (observing that the
“Court of Appeals neither accepted nor rejected the tort and expressly stated
that it did not need to decide that issue because the complaint did not
adequately allege undue influence, the underlying alleged misconduct,” and
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Nebraska,137 New York,138 South Carolina,139 Tennessee,140 and
Virginia.141 In addition, the intermediate appellate courts in
Washington142 and Hawaii143 have declined to recognize the tort.
concluding that while circumstances may exist under which the Court of
Appeals would recognize tortious interference, no such circumstances existed
on the facts presented); see also Klein, supra note 86, at 284–91 (“Although
the Maryland courts seem[] sympathetic to the tort in principle, none has yet
encountered a factual situation warranting relief, and all have so far declined
to recognize it.”) (footnote omitted).
136. Hauck v. Seright, 964 P.2d 749, 753 (Mont. 1998) (discussing tortious
interference and concluding that the facts as presented did not require the
court to “address whether tortious interference with an expectancy will be
recognized as a cause of action in Montana.”); see Klein, supra note 119, at 18
(discussing Montana’s decision to decline recognition of the tort).
137. Litherland v. Jurgens, 869 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Neb. 2015) (declining to
adopt the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance, noting that
claimant had adequate probate remedies).
138. Vogt v. Witmeyer, 665 N.E.2d 189, 190 (N.Y. 1996) (“New York,
however, has not recognized a right of action for tortious interference with
prospective inheritance[.]”) (citing Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104, 110 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1845)); O’Sullivan v. Hallock, 101 A.D.3d 1313, 1314 (N.Y. App. Div.
2012) (“New York does not recognize a cause of action for
tortious
interference with prospective inheritance[.]”); see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra
note 83, at 355–56 (discussing Hutchins and New York’s dismissal of tort
claim); see also Klein, supra note 13, at 282 (stating the New York has
“explicitly rejected the tort”).
139. Malloy v. Thompson, 762 S.E.2d 690, 692 (S.C. 2014) (“[T]his opinion
must not be understood as either adopting or rejecting the tort of intentional
interference with inheritance.”); Douglass ex rel. Louthian v. Boyce, 542
S.E.2d 715, 717 (S.C. 2001) (“We have not adopted the tort of intentional
interference with inheritance[.]”); see Klein, supra note 86, at 291 (observing
that South Carolina does not recognize tortious interference).
140. Stewart v. Sewell, 215 S.W.3d 815, 827 (Tenn. 2007) (observing that
Tennessee does not recognize tortious interference); see generally Fell v.
Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 850 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“We decline to use this
case to determine whether Tennessee should adopt the tort of interference
with inheritance or gift.”); Renfroe, supra note 89, at 386–406.
141. Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E.2d 714, 720 (Va. 2000) (“We also
agree with the trial court that a cause of action for ‘tortious interference with
inheritance’ is not recognized in Virginia.”); Carter v. Wyczalkowski, 79 Va.
Cir. 599 (2009) (citing Economopoulos, 528 S.E.2d at 720) (“Virginia does not
recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with an inheritance.”);
Klein, supra note 86, at 292 (observing that Virginia “does not recognize a
cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance.”).
142. In re Estate of Hendrix, 134 Wash. App. 1007 (2006) (declining to
recognize tortious interference on the facts presented); Hadley v. Cowan, 804
P.2d 1271, 1274, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing interference claims
but acknowledging they were barred by res judicata following settlement in a
preceding will contest); see Klein, supra note 89, at 228–31 (“[I]n 2006, the
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Notably, these cases do not, for the most part, represent wholesale
rejection of tortious interference. Instead, they have “declined to
recognize the tort on the facts presented rather than categorically
rejecting it . . . .”144 Unfortunately, this has left commentators
and courts in disagreement as to the appropriate treatment of
these cases.145 For instance, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit highlighted an Arkansas Supreme Court case
in support of its conclusion that most courts addressing tortious
interference have declined to recognize the tort where the
claimant failed to first pursue an adequate probate remedy.146
One is left to wonder whether it is fair to say that Arkansas
actually recognizes tortious interference based on its decision in
Jackson v. Kelly, or whether the case simply indicates that
Arkansas has not, in fact, adopted the tort—rendering its
pronouncements on the prerequisites for suit little better than
dicta.147 Broad pronouncements about the nature of tortious
interference can blur these issues.
Not every state requires a magnifying glass to discern its
intentions with respect to tortious interference. Three states
employ comparably strong language in rejecting tortious
interference: Nebraska,148 New York,149 and Virginia.150
Washington Court of Appeals explicitly declined to recognize the tort[.]”).
143. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362 n.185 (citing Foo v. Foo, 65
P.3d 182 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003)) (stating that, in an opinion that was “not
precedential under Hawaii Rule of Appellate Procedure 35[,]” the court
declined to recognize tortious interference because probate remedies were
available); see Klein, supra note 89, at 228 (describing Foo as “express[ing]
the Hawaii Court of Appeals’ antipathy towards recognizing a tort claim
arising from the alleged depletion of the assets of a marital trust”).
144. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362 (citing, inter alia, Ex parte
Bachelor, 803 So.2d 515 (Ala. 2001); Jackson v. Kelly, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331–34
(Ark. 2001); Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 661 A.2d 726, 728 (Md. 1995); and
Hauck v. Seright, 964 P.2d 749, 753 (Mont. 1998)). See also Axe v. Wilson, 96
P.2d 880, 881 (Kan. 1939).
145. See, e.g., Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted).
146. Id.
147. See 44 S.W.3d 328 (Ark. 2001).
148. Litherland v. Jurgens, 869 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Neb. 2015) (noting that
the Nebraska Supreme Court had already “expressed strong disapproval of
the tort in Manon v. Orr, 856 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Neb. 2014)”).
149. Vogt v. Witmeyer, 665 N.E.2d 189, 190 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that New
York does not recognize tortious interference); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill
104, 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“[The] plaintiff had no interest in the property
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Moreover, New York possesses an alternative remedy to tortious
interference: it “has a very well-developed jurisprudence relating
to . . . the imposition of a constructive trust . . . .”151 Though this
equitable remedy may be an imperfect solution to the problems
that the tort is aimed at solving,152 its availability may be one
reason why New York remains one of the few jurisdictions that
has consistently declined to recognize tortious interference.153
Virginia’s most recent decision on the tort, by contrast, offers little
insight into the Virginia Supreme Court’s reasons for declining to
recognize tortious interference.154 Still, Virginia has at least
addressed the tort and opined on its viability as a cause of action.
Many states have yet to offer any insight into their approach to
the tort.
D. States that Have Not yet Spoken on the Tort
In particular, twelve states offer little on the subject of
tortious
interference.
Alaska,155 Arizona,156 Colorado,157
of which he says he has been deprived by the fraudulent interference of the
defendant, beyond a mere naked possibility; an interest which might, indeed,
influence his hopes and expectations, but which is altogether too shadowy
and evanescent to be dealt with by courts of law.”) (emphasis added).
150. Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E.2d 714, 720 (Va. 2000) (“[A]
cause of action for ‘tortious interference with inheritance’ is not recognized in
Virginia.”).
151. Klein, supra note 13, at 282.
152. Id. at 239–40 (noting that a constructive trust will not “fully
compensate certain potential tort plaintiffs or deter certain tort
defendants[,]” given that it is imposed on the party in actual possession of
estate assets, it is subject to equitable defenses, and it does not enable parties
to obtain certain types of damages).
153. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 365 (suggesting that the
“equitable remedy of constructive trust” may offer “adequate relief” to
disappointed beneficiaries who are not afforded a full recovery through a will
contest).
154. See Economopoulos, 528 S.E.2d at 720; see also Klein, supra note 86,
at 292–93.
155. Klein, supra note 89, at 214 (“Alaska has no reported cases
addressing [tortious interference].”); Renfroe, supra note 89, at 396 (stating
that Alaska has “never considered whether to adopt the tort”).
156. Fassold, supra note 89, at 31 (“Arizona has not yet recognized a
claim for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance.”); Klein, supra
note 119, at 19 (“Arizona has a reported opinion merely mentioning the
tort[.]”); see also Coonley & Coonley v. Turck, 844 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993) (quoting a letter written by an attorney threatening malpractice
related to tortious interference).
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Mississippi,158 Nevada,159 New Hampshire,160 North Dakota,161
Oklahoma,162 South Dakota,163 Utah,164 Vermont,165 and
Wyoming166 have either no cases that mention the tort or only

157. Klein, supra note 119, at 4 (“[N]o state court [in Colorado] has yet
granted a recovery” based on tortious interference). Some commentators cite
Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1975) and McGregor v. McGregor,
101 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951), aff’d, 201 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1953) for the
proposition that Colorado recognizes tortious interference. See, e.g., Fassold,
supra note 89, at 26 n.2, 30 n.34; Renfroe, supra note 89, at 393, 397 n.88.
However, at best, Peffer contains a federal court’s projection about how a
Colorado state court may address the tort. See Peffer, 523 F.2d at 1325. At
worst, Peffer parrots the ambiguous holding of McGregor, in which it was not
clear whether Colorado or Louisiana law was being applied. See Klein, supra
note 2, at 108. Indeed, the authors agree with Diane Klein’s conclusion that
McGregor applied Louisiana law, not Colorado law. Id.
158. Klein, supra note 2, at 126–27.
159. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Klein, supra note
119, at 20 (“Nevada has no reported cases even mentioning tortious
interference with expectation of inheritance.”).
160. Klein, supra note 119, at 40; Klein, supra note 13, at 291–92.
161. Klein, supra note 119, at 40.
162. See id. at 38; see also Fox v. Kramer (In re Estate of Estes), 983 P.2d
438, 442 n.2 (Okla. 1999) (“Because the suit was not one in tort, we need not
address the issue of whether Oklahoma recognizes a tort for wrongful
interference of an inheritance as urged by [plaintiff].”); Miller v. Johnson, 307
P.3d 387, 389 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (“We interpret Estes to mean Oklahoma
has never recognized wrongful interference with inheritance as a cognizable
tort, and our examination of the law does not indicate otherwise.”).
163. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Thomas E.
Simmons, Testamentary Incapacity, Undue Influence, and Insane Delusions,
60 S.D. L. REV. 175, 214–15 (2015) (“The nascent tort known as tortious
interference with an expectancy has not to date been recognized or considered
for recognition in South Dakota, either legislatively or by judicial fiat.”).
164. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Klein, supra note
119, at 19. The only case connected to Utah even mentioning the tort is
Tarbet v. Miller, No. 2:05-CV-00635 PGC, 2006 WL 1982747, at *3–4 (D.
Utah July 13, 2006). However, Tarbet says nothing about whether Utah
would recognize tortious interference, and only discusses whether the
allegations related to that cause of action “provide the particularity required
by Rule 9(b)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tarbet, 2006 WL
1982747, at *3–4.
165. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Klein, supra note
13, at 293.
166. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; see Klein, supra
note 119, at 20; see also Estate of McLean ex rel Hall v. Benson, 71 P.3d 750,
750–54 (Wyo. 2003) (dismissing appeal from order admitting will to probate
while civil litigation remained pending, where civil litigation included
allegations of tortious interference).
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offer references to tortious interference in passing.167 This is
surprising given the publication of Section 774B in 1979, nearly
forty years ago.168 It may be that these states have not yet been
faced with a set of facts that could give rise to a tortious
interference claim. Certainly, even some of the states that have
declined to recognize the tort have done so, again, based on the
facts in front of them, while avoiding rejection of the tort itself.169
Nevertheless, in time, states that have not yet spoken on the
subject could alter the existing landscape of the tort significantly.
That landscape, and the great deal of variety that characterizes it,
will be the focus of the next section of this Article.
III. DIFFERENCES AMONG STATES ADOPTING THE TORT

A.

Noteworthy Variations

While there are a multitude of differences in how states
approach tortious interference, right down to the label used for the
tort,170 there are several variations that merit further
consideration. In particular, many courts require claimants to
exhaust their probate remedies prior to bringing a claim for
tortious interference; at least one state has identified an extra
“element” to the tort; some jurisdictions limit the types of damages
available to successful litigants; and still others have made
167. See Estate of McLean ex rel Hall v. Benson, 71 P.3d 750, 752 (Wy.
2003) (indicates that complaint contained count for intentional interference
with an expected inheritance without further discussion thereof).
168. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 360.
169. Id. at 362.
170. See, e.g., Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc.,
C.A. No. PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 11 n.6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (“For
purposes of clarity, although this tort is referred to in slightly different ways
throughout the jurisdictions that recognize it, the Court will refer to the tort
as ‘tortious interference with expectation of inheritance.’ Other iterations
include ‘tortious interference with inheritance’ or ‘tortious interference with
expectancy of inheritance.’”); Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203
(Ohio 1993) (“With regard to certified question No. 1, the federal court order
uses the language, ‘with expectancy or inheritance.’ The briefs of the parties
present different versions of this phrase: Petitioners . . . state, ‘with
expectancy of inheritance’; respondents . . . use the language, ‘with
expectancy of an inheritance’; [another] respondent . . . states, ‘with an
expected inheritance’; and [other] respondents . . . track the language of the
federal court order to-wit, ‘with expectancy or inheritance’”) (emphasis and
alterations in original).
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pronouncements on the proper court to bring such claims. This
Article will focus on these critical points of tension among the
courts that have addressed and/or adopted tortious interference
because they offer insights into the policy rationale underlying the
creation of the tort and the wrongs sought to be addressed by its
adoption.
B. Elements of Tortious Interference
Many courts look to the Restatement formulation of tortious
interference in developing and establishing the elements of the
cause of action.171 The Restatement formulation can
be
understood to contain at least five elements: “(1) the existence of
an expectancy; (2) defendant’s intentional interference with the
expectancy; (3) conduct that is tortious in itself, such as fraud,
duress, or undue influence; (4) a reasonable certainty that the
expectancy would have been realized but for the interference; and
(5) damages.”172 In comparison, Florida sets out four elements of
the tort that combine the “intentional interference” and
“independently tortious” aspects of the Restatement formulation
into a single element: “(1) the existence of an expectancy;
(2) intentional interference with the expectancy through tortious
conduct; (3) causation; and (4) damages.”173 Notably, Oregon’s
own adoption of the tort contemplates an extension of an existing
tort, the tort of intentional interference
with
economic
relations.174 As a result, the elements are the same although the
171. In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill. 2009) (citing, inter alia,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 744B(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Firestone,
616 N.E.2d at 203 (adopting tortious interference and declaring “[w]e find
particularly instructive Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1979) 58, Section
774B[.]”); accord Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1992); Fell v.
Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Renfroe, supra
note 89, at 132.
172. Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 203; see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 27
(describing the five elements of tortious interference as set out by the
Restatement).
173. Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So. 2d 2, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing
Davison v. Feuerherd, 391 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nita Ledford,
Intentional Interference with Inheritance, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 325,
327 (1995); see also Henry v. Jones, 202 So. 3d 129, 132–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (identifying the same four elements of tortious interference);
Klein, supra note 2, at 110.
174. Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (Or. 1999).
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economic relation at issue stems from a noncommercial
relationship: “(1) the existence of a professional or business
relationship (which could include, e.g., a contract or a prospective
economic advantage); (2) intentional interference with that
relationship or advantage; (3) by a third party; (4) accomplished
through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a causal
effect between the interference and the harm to the relationship
or prospective advantage; and (6) damages.”175 The difference
between Oregon’s version of the elements of the tort appears to
derive from the requirement that a claimant independently
establish (a) the existence of a relationship or advantage, rather
than expectancy; and (b) the tortfeasor’s status as a third party to
that relationship or advantage.176 Again, these two elements are
fused into one in the traditional Restatement formulation: because
a claimant need only show his or her expectancy, there is no need
to make a showing of a relationship with the donor or testator,
coupled with a need to separately show that the tortfeasor was a
stranger to that relationship.177
Nevertheless, each of the foregoing versions of tortious
interference boil down to the same essential elements:
interference, through tortious conduct, that causes damages to the
claimant. Whether the interference is with an “expectancy” itself
or with a relationship giving rise to the expectancy alters the
175. Id. at 202.
176. Id. The requirement that a tortfeasor be a third party to the
relationship at issue in this tort is commonly understood to be a requirement
in the analogous tort of interference with contractual relations. See, e.g.,
Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 397 (7th Cir.
2003) (“A party may not be charged with tortious interference with respect to
its own contract.”); see also A. Michael Ferrill & James K. Spivey, Clearing
the Sylvania Hurdle: Developments in Business Torts and Dealer
Termination, 11 ANTITRUST 5, 5 (Fall 1996) (“As a general proposition, a party
to a contract is legally incapable of tortiously interfering with its own
contracts.”) (citations ommited). Some courts and commentators speculate
that this limitation springs from concerns about tort concepts “encroaching”
onto disputes that are more properly resolved by contract principles. See
Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 15 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing “third
party” requirement under Georgia law); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious
Interference with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical
Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 136 (1999); Mark P. Gergen, Tortious
Interference: How It is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This is Not Entirely
Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175, 1197, 1219–20 (1996).
177. Allen, 974 P.2d at 202.
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elements slightly, but ultimately does not translate into
significant differences in analyses.178 For example, in Allen v.
Hall, the seminal case recognizing tortious interference in Oregon,
the Supreme Court of Oregon applied the elements of tortious
interference with economic relations to a tortious interference
claim, concluding succinctly that:
Plaintiffs have alleged facts that satisfy the first element
of the tort, viz., the existence of a prospective economic
advantage in the form of a prospective inheritance. They
have also alleged the second and third elements, viz., an
intentional interference by a third party: They have
alleged that, after learning that [the testator] intended to
change his will, [the tortfeasor]—a third party—took
179
steps to prevent that eventuality
In other words, the plaintiffs in Allen essentially had to prove the
same elements as they would be required to do in a Restatementderived tortious interference claim, with the exception that the
requisite showing was broken down into six elements, rather than
five.180
The most significant departure from the elements of Section
774B comes from Massachusetts, where tortious interference
contains an element of “continuous interference”:
The defendant must intentionally interfere with the
plaintiff’s expectancy in an unlawful way. The plaintiff
must have a legally protected interest. The plaintiff must
show that the defendant’s interference acted continuously
on the donor until the time the expectancy would have
been realized.181

178. Id. (describing the “very close analogy that exists between an
expectancy of inheritance and those other interests to which this court
already has extended the protections of the tort of intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage”) (emphasis added); see also Barone v.
Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Va. 1982) (describing tortious interference as
“analogous to tortious interference with business interests . . . or tortious
interference with contractual relations”).
179. Allen, 974 P.2d at 204.
180. Compare id. at 204 with Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203
(Ohio 1993); see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 27 (describing the five
elements of tortious interference as set out by the Restatement).
181. Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Mass. 1997) (emphasis
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It is apparent that the first two requirements echo the
Restatement formulation: intentional interference that is itself
unlawful182 and an expectancy that constitutes a legally protected
interest.183 Unique, then, is Massachusetts’s requirement of the
interference acting “continuously” on the donor until his or her
death—a requirement that has existed nearly as long as the tort
itself in that state.184 As early as 1907, in the pivotal case
recognizing tortious interference in Massachusetts, Lewis v.
Corbin, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that tortious
interference must operate “up to the time of [the testator’s] death”
in order to establish an “actionable wrong.”185 Specifically, it held
that the pleading at issue was “defective” because it failed to make
factual allegations that would “exclude the possibility that the
testatrix changed her purpose in regard to [the] legacy [at issue],
and which show that the fraud continued operative to the time of

added) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
182. See, e.g., Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 203 (including “intentional
interference” and “conduct by the defendant involving the interference which
is tortious” and citing Restatement); In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241
(Ill. 2009) (same).
183. See, e.g., Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 203 (including “expectancy” as
element and citing Restatement); In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d at 241
(same). With respect to the meaning of “legally protected interest,”
Massachusetts courts have opined that this element can be understood to
refer to the types of expected inheritances and bequests that normally qualify
as expectancies under the Restatement formulation. See, e.g., Coyne v.
Nascimento, 937 N.E.2d 522 (2010) (unpublished memorandum and order
pursuant to Rule 1:28) (“[T]he injury to the plaintiff occurs upon the relevant
donor’s death, the moment at which the plaintiff’s expected inheritance
becomes a legally protected interest[.]”) (emphasis added); O’Regan v. Migell,
63 N.E.3d 63 (2016) (unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to Rule
1:28) (“[The claimant’s] expectation of inheriting under [the testator’s] will
qualified as a legally-protected interest.”). At least one commentator’s
analysis of the tort indicates that perhaps “legally protected interest” was a
rationale for early courts’ failure to adopt tortious interference—i.e., a “mere
expectancy,” by contrast, was not protectable—such that Massachusetts’s
formulation of the tort could derive from those early court decisions. See
Renfroe, supra note 89, at 133.
184. Klein, supra note 13, at 264–65 (“Massachusetts has applied a
distinctive understanding of the tort, requiring specific allegations and proof
that the wrongful conduct of the defendant acted ‘continuously’ upon the
donor until the legacy would be ‘realized’ (i.e., the donor’s death).”); see also
Lewis v. Corbin, 81 N.E. 248, 250 (Mass. 1907).
185. Lewis, 81 N.E. at 250.
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her death, and thus caused the loss to the plaintiff.”186
Several decades later, in Labonte v. Giordano, the Supreme
Judicial Court expounded upon its rationale for the requirement
that such interference be “continuous.”187 In essence, the court
explained, the condition could help to demonstrate that a
tortfeasor’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s damage; that the donor
had “no opportunity . . . to overcome the defendant’s interference”
before his or her death; and that the cause of action had properly
accrued since condition in fact required the donor to have passed
away.188 It is fair to say that the first two reasons appear simply
to state that the “continuous interference” requirement supports a
claimant’s case for causation in attempting to show tortious
interference.189 The third “function”
of
the
continuous
interference requirement offers more insight into the
Massachusetts iteration of tortious interference because it shows
that the cause of action only arises at the time of a donor’s death,
because “any such expectancy would only be realized at that
time.”190 Put differently, Massachusetts places the availability of
tortious interference squarely in the time after a donor’s death,
and not before.191 As will be discussed, other states have limited
the availability of tortious interference to actions after the death
of a donor using different methods; it appears only Massachusetts
has taken the step to include this requirement in the very
elements of the tort.192

186. Id.
187. Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Mass. 1997).
188. Id.
189. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court directly states that requiring
continuous interference serves the function of showing “that the defendant’s
interference was the legal cause of damage to the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis
added). Moreover, the suggestion that a showing of “continuous interference”
demonstrates that the donor had “no opportunity” to overcome any such
interference also goes directly to the issue of causation—i.e. was a donor’s
disposition of property due to interference, or was he or she able to overcome
such interference before her death? Id. In this way, the first two “functions”
cited by the Supreme Judicial Court for this requirement appear to be
duplicative.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. Klein, supra note 13, at 264–65.
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C. Adequate Probate Remedies and Collateral Attack
Arguably the most significant difference among jurisdictions
that have adopted tortious interference is how each state answers
the question of whether a claimant may proceed despite the
existence of “adequate” probate remedies or whether those
remedies must be exhausted before bringing a cause of action in
tort.193 More often than not, courts that have addressed tortious
interference require litigants to exhaust probate remedies or
otherwise prohibit them from proceeding with the tort action if
adequate probate remedies exist.194 Otherwise, the logic goes, the
tort action would constitute an impermissible “collateral attack”
on a probate proceeding.195 For example, if a will contest is
available to litigants attempting to initiate a tortious interference
claim, and “a successful contest would provide complete relief,”
courts have held that proceeding on the tort is not “warranted.”196
Only a few take the position that a tortious interference claimant
can proceed even if there are presumably adequate probate
193. See Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 886 (Me. 1995) (describing “a
rule, adopted in several jurisdictions, which requires plaintiffs to exhaust
probate remedies before pursuing actions for tortious interference with an
expected legacy, provided that the probate remedies are adequate to
compensate them for their damages”); see also DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d
216, 221 (Fla. 1981); Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello, 454 N.E. 2d
288, 293–94 (Ill. 1983); Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 197 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Ky.
1946); Labonte, 687 N.E.2d at 1256; Johnson v. Stevenson, 152 S.E.2d 214,
217 (N.C. 1967); Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ohio 1993);
Renfroe, supra note 89, at 140–41; Orr, supra note 89, at 751 (“Many
jurisdictions . . . have refused to provide relief under the tort because the
plaintiff had standing to contest the decedent’s will in the probate court and
failed to do so.”).
194. See Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing
as the “majority position that a cause of action for tortious interference with
an expectancy of inheritance, if it lies at all, would not lie where an adequate
statutory remedy is available but has not been pursued”); see also Fassold,
supra note 89, at 28 (“Most states that have considered the issue have held
that a claim for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance may only
be brought where conventional probate relief would be inadequate.”);
Johnson, supra note 9, at 774; Hortenstine, supra note 97, at 742 (identifying
Illinois as a state where “all remedies via will contest must be exhausted”
prior to bringing a tortious interference claim).
195. DeWitt, 408 So. 2d at 218 (citing cases); see also Fassold, supra note
89, at 31; Johnson, supra note 9, at 775–76.
196. See Fassold, supra note 89, at 29 (citing In re Estate of Hoover, 513
N.E.2d 991, 992 (Ill. App. 1987)).
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remedies for the underlying “wrong.”197 To better understand the
difference in approach, it is helpful to begin with one of the first
decisions to explore at length the rationale for requiring litigants
to exhaust their probate remedies: the Supreme Court of Florida’s
decision of DeWitt v. Duce.198
In DeWitt, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit199 certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
Does Florida law, statutory or otherwise, preclude
plaintiffs from proving the essential elements of their
claim for tortious interference with an inheritance where
the alleged wrongfully procured will has been probated in
a Florida court and plaintiffs had notice of the probate
proceeding and an opportunity to contest the validity of
the will therein but chose not to do so?200
The facts of the case were straightforward: Arthur Welch died
testate in 1975, and his will was admitted to probate in Florida.201
Thereafter, Plaintiffs Evelyn G. DeWitt and Mabel M. DeWitt
filed a Petition for Revocation of Probate of Welch’s will.202
Ultimately, however, the plaintiffs decided to dismiss their
Petition, opting instead to take pursuant to the disposition in
Welch’s will.203 Yet less than three years later, the plaintiffs
initiated suit against Welch’s housekeeper, Estelle Duce, in
federal court, bringing a claim for tortious interference.204 Their
complaint alleged that Duce, along with two others, had unduly
influenced Welch, and that the defendant’s undue influence
caused Welch to replace his prior will with another will that
197. See Plimpton, 668 A.2d at 887; Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260,
264 (Va. 1982).
198. 408 So.2d at 218.
199. By the time that the DeWitt decision was issued, Florida came within
the newly created Eleventh Circuit, which is why the decision refers to the
“former Fifth Circuit”; when the question was originally certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida, the relevant court of appeals was still the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See History of the Federal
Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.
nsf/page/landmark_21.html, (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
200. DeWitt, 408 So.2d at 217.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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disfavored the plaintiffs.205
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint,
finding that pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 733.103(2),206
plaintiffs’ action was precluded because in essence, they would be
“relitigating issues of undue influence and testamentary capacity,
and thus prevent[] proof of elements vital to a claim of tortious
interference.”207 After the plaintiffs appealed, the Fifth Circuit
certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Florida.208
The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that tortious
interference had been recognized before by courts in the state, but
noted it had never before reached the issue of whether proceeding
with the tort would be a “collateral attack” on a preexisting
probate court decision.209 The court surveyed a number of
decisions on the subject and drew the conclusion that “[c]ases
which allow the action for tortious interference with a
testamentary expectancy are predicated on the inadequacy of
probate remedies.”210 In other words, the problem of collateral
attack only arose to the extent that a litigant possessed an
adequate remedy in the probate proceedings and, regardless,
pursued an action for tortious interference.211 The plaintiffs in
DeWitt, the court concluded, had an adequate remedy in the
probate proceedings because Welch’s previous will, favoring the
plaintiffs, existed.212 Accordingly, a will contest could have
theoretically made the plaintiffs whole.213 The DeWitt court
identified the possibility for the converse situation to arise, noting
language from W. Bowe & D. Parker’s treatise, Page On Wills,
which stated:
Probate can strike from the will something that is in it as
205. Id.
206. “In any collateral action or proceeding relating to devised property,
the probate of a will in Florida shall be conclusive of its due execution; that it
was executed by a competent testator, free of fraud, duress, mistake, and
undue influence; and of the fact that the will was unrevoked on the testator’s
death.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.103(2) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
207. DeWitt, 408 So.2d at 218.
208. Id. at 217–18.
209. Id. at 218.
210. Id. at 219.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 220.
213. Id.
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a result of fraud but cannot add to the will a provision
that is not there nor can the probate court bring into
being a will which the testator was prevented from
making and executing by fraud.214
The foregoing exemplifies the circumstances under which
courts have been willing to recognize tortious interference. After
all, probate remedies are hardly adequate where a will contest
would never enable a litigant to probate a favorable will because,
for instance, such a will never existed. The Supreme Court of
Florida’s reasoning in DeWitt has been echoed by other courts in
the time since.
The decision of Plimpton v. Gerrard by the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court stands in sharp contrast to the preceding
authority.215 Again, the underlying facts are relatively simple.
Axel and Flossie Plimpton had one child, Bernard Plimpton.216
However, the senior Plimptons left the bulk of their estate to
Martin Gerrard, a man who “established a relationship with the
Plimptons when they were elderly and in poor
health.”217
Bernard Plimpton, the plaintiff, brought suit against Martin
Gerrard for tortious interference with an expected inheritance.218
In holding that the plaintiff had standing to pursue this claim, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court set itself apart from DeWitt and
other decisions concerning the existence of adequate probate
remedies, stating:
The theoretical possibility of adequate relief in the
Probate Court does not compel Bernard to go there to
pursue his tortious interference claim. The law provides
concurrent jurisdiction in the Probate Court and the
Superior Court for Bernard’s claim of undue influence in
the inter vivos transfer (though the Probate Court action
could only be filed by the personal representative). The
very concept of concurrent jurisdiction is inconsistent

214. Id. at 219 n.7 (quoting W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS, § 14.8
at 706–07 (1960) (footnote omitted)).
215. 668 A.2d 882 (Me. 1995).
216. Id. at 884.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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with a preference for one jurisdiction over another.219
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in so holding, emphasized
the concept of concurrent jurisdiction in determining that the
plaintiff did not need to first exhaust his potential probate
remedies to bring a tortious interference claim.220 Indeed, the
differing remedies available to the plaintiff in a civil case versus a
probate action were highlighted by the court in Plimpton and are
worthy of discussion in their own right.221
D. Damages and Adequacy of Remedies
Tortious interference offers an opportunity for litigants to
recover directly from a bad actor, rather than from an estate.222
However, the source of a claimant’s recovery is not the only
difference between recovering in a civil action as compared to a
probate action. A party successful in a civil case can receive more
than just that to which he or she was entitled in a will contest.223
Specifically, courts have acknowledged that in pursuing a claim
for tortious interference, it becomes possible for parties to obtain
compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, emotional distress
damages, and even punitive damages.224 This distinction from
219. Id. at 887.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Klein, supra note 86, at 265 (“As a legal claim in personam against
the interfering tortfeasor, the costs of prosecuting and defending the action—
and paying a judgment, if the action is successful—are borne by the parties,
not the estate. In contrast to a will contest or a probate claim, the tort
defendant must answer.”); see also Johnson, supra note 9, at 772;
Hortenstine, supra note 97, at 756 (describing the tort claim as “an in
personam judgment . . . brought against a tortfeasor”).
223. See also Johnson, supra note 9, at 772; Hortenstine, supra note 97,
at 741–42.
224. Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 1992); see also Orr, supra
note 89, at 751, 777–78; see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 26 (acknowledging
that tortious interference “permits the recovery of punitive damages and
attorneys’ fees, which a will contest normally does not”); Renfroe, supra note
89, at 391–92 (describing remedies available in tortious interference actions
and including “damages . . . [equal to] the value that the plaintiff lost as a
result of the defendant’s tortious interference[;] . . . [c]onsequential
damages[;]” and, in “some jurisdictions . . . punitive damages, and . . .
damages for emotional distress”); but see DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 220
n.11 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Hoover, 513 N.E.2d 991, 992 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987).
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what a litigant may recover in a will contest is important because,
as commentators have noted, without the existence of tortious
interference, the realities of litigating a will contest may enable
tortfeasors to reap the benefits of their bad acts, consequencefree.225
Consider this: if a testator executes a will benefiting two
heirs, and one heir later convinces the testator to change the will
in his favor using fraud, at the testator’s death, the malfeasant
heir can only benefit.226 The original will still benefits both heirs,
so even if the later will is voided through a will contest because it
was procured by fraud, the bad actor can still take under the
will.227 Worse still, the bad actor’s attorneys’ fees will generally
be paid by the estate.228 Arguably, then, the tortfeasor risks
nothing by engaging in tortious conduct that interferes with a
third party’s expected inheritance.229
Nevertheless, the opportunities to provide
additional
remedies and to deter bad actors from attempting to benefit from
their tortious acts, are still not always enough to push courts to
find a litigant’s probate relief inadequate.230 For example, on
more than one occasion, courts have dismissed the availability of
punitive damages as a method of demonstrating that probate
225. Fassold, supra note 89, at 26 (citing Curtis E. Shirley, Tortious
Interference with an Expectancy, 41 RES GESTAE 16 (Oct. 1997)); see also
Johnson, supra note 9, at 770 (describing a similar example); Hortenstine,
supra note 97, at 741–42 (identifying the different remedies available in a
will contest versus tort litigation).
226. Fassold, supra note 89, at 26.
227. Id.
228. Id.; see also Orr, supra note 89, at 779.
229. See Fassold, supra note 89, at 26; see also Hortenstine, supra note
97, at 742 (noting that “if one thinks they can tortiously interfere with
another’s expectancy, so as to procure a benefit for themselves, they have
nothing to lose by ‘going for it’”).
230. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 220 n.11 (Fla. 1981) (“For
purposes of adequacy of relief we do not consider punitive damages as a valid
expectation. Adequacy is predicated on what the probate court can give as
compared to what the plaintiff reasonably expected from the testator prior to
interference. Additionally, we can find no case authority allowing punitive
damages in this type of action.”) (emphasis added); see also Fassold, supra
note 89, at 29 (acknowledging that the “unavailability [of punitive damages]
does not itself constitute inadequate relief, such that a contestant would be
permitted automatically to bring a tort action in which such damages are
sought”); Johnson, supra note 9, at 774 (“Commentators have noted that the
probate system has virtually no deterrent effect.”) (footnote omitted).
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court cannot afford adequate relief.231 This is not necessarily the
case with attorneys’ fees: interestingly, a recent Massachusetts
Superior Court decision suggests that attorneys’ fees, which are
generally not available in probate court, may offer an alternative
basis for pursuing relief in a separate tort action.232 In Hadayia
v. Kay, the Superior Court recounted plaintiffs’ successful will
contest against the defendants in probate court.233 In that action,
plaintiffs had shown that the late Jane Naimey, who originally
executed a will in 1986 favoring the plaintiffs, executed a new will
in 1991 favoring the defendants, a family that “gained overall
control of all of Jane’s financial and personal affairs” in a matter
of weeks following the first meeting between the defendants and
Jane.234 The probate court found that the 1991 will was the
product of undue influence and fraud, ordered the defendants to
reimburse Jane’s estate, and, eventually, allowed the plaintiffs to
probate the 1986 will.235
The questions in the superior court became (1) whether to
grant the plaintiffs summary judgment on their claim against the
defendants for tortious interference, based upon the probate
court’s findings, and (2) to what damages were plaintiffs
entitled.236 In response to the first question, the superior court
held that the facts found by the probate court “clearly include[d]
each of the[] elements” of tortious interference as established in
Massachusetts.237 To the latter, the Hadayia decision recognized
that although the American rule traditionally precluded recovery
231. Johnson, supra note 9, at 774; see also Firestone v. Galbreath, 895 F.
Supp. 917, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Maxwell v. Sw. Nat’l Bank, 593 F. Supp.
250, 253 (D. Kan. 1984); Jackson v. Kelly, 44 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Ark. 2001); In
re Estate of Hoover, 513 N.E.2d 991, 992 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987).
232. Hadayia v. Kay, No. C.A. 97-01110, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 489
(Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1999) (permitting plaintiffs to pursue tort action to
recover attorneys’ fees following successful probate court action concerning
“wrongfully procured” will).
233. Id. at *9.
234. Id. at *2, 4–5.
235. Id. at *9–10.
236. Id. at *15–21.
237. Id. at *14–15 (citing Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1254–55
(Mass. 1997)) (“[T]he plaintiffs must prove three elements: that they had a
legally protected interest; that the defendants intentionally interfered with
the plaintiffs’ expectancy in an unlawful way, such as by duress, fraud, or
undue influence; and that the defendants’ interference acted continuously on
the donor until the time the expectancy would have been realized.”).
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of attorneys’ fees, an exception was available for cases of tortious
interference “requiring the victim of the tort to sue or defend
against a third party in order to protect his rights.”238 It remains
to be seen whether, unlike punitive damages, the recovery of
attorneys’ fees will be viewed by other courts in a similar way: as
a way to pursue tortious interference despite the existence of an
available will contest. At least a few courts have allowed for the
award of attorneys’ fees and costs as part of ensuring that
litigants are afforded a complete recovery—perhaps the better
rule.239
E.

Inter Vivos Conveyances and Tortious Interference Before a
Testator’s Death

Last, courts remain divided over the application of tortious
interference where there have been challenges to inter vivos
conveyances or to testamentary bequests drafted and set out in
estate planning documents before the death of a testator. As to
the latter, Maine appears to be the only state that has permitted
so called “pre-death” actions to proceed.240 Specifically, in
Harmon v. Harmon, the plaintiff claimed that his brother and
sister-in-law had, “by fraud and undue influence induced the
[p]laintiff’s mother . . . while she was 87 years old and in ill
health, to transfer to the [d]efendants valuable property.”241
These transfers had the practical effect of disinheriting the
plaintiff.242 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the
plaintiff, as an “expectant legatee,” could proceed with his tortious
interference claim because the tort was meant to protect his
interest in an “expectation, and not the certainty,” of a future
benefit under a will.243 The Harmon court held that the injury
was “complete” once the wrongful conduct occurred, and the
problem was then only one of valuation.244 At present, Maine is
238. Id. at *20 (quoting M.F. Roach Co. v. Town of Provincetown, 247
N.E.2d 377, 378 (Mass. 1969)).
239. See Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323, 1324–26 (10th Cir. 1975);
Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 1992); King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d
750, 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); see also Hortenstine, supra note 97, at 759–60.
240. Harmon v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1024–25 (Me. 1979).
241. Id. at 1021.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1021–22.
244. Id. at 1023.
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the only state that has gone this far in its recognition of tortious
interference, and other courts have explicitly rejected such
application.245
Despite Maine standing alone as the sole jurisdiction to allow
the tort under such circumstances, other states, such as Georgia,
have made tortious interference available with respect to inter
vivos conveyances.246 In particular, courts note that inter vivos
conveyances could specifically result in a will contest being
deemed inadequate, since even a litigant’s success in a will contest
would not necessarily extend to the return of such inter vivos
transfers.247 For example, even in DeWitt, wherein the Supreme
245. See, e.g., Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(affirming dismissal of action for tortious interference where claim was “filed
by a nonfamily member prior to the death of the testator under
circumstances that do not suggest that a remedy subsequent to death will be
unavailable or inadequate”); Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1256
(Mass. 1997) (declaring the court to be “unpersuaded by the conclusions in
the Harmon opinion and declin[ing] to recognize a new cause of action” for
tortious interference where a donor is still alive, but granting leave to amend
her complaint because of the donor’s death during the pendency of the
plaintiff’s appeal); see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 28; Renfroe, supra note
89, at 391: but see Carlton v. Carlton, 575 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (“It is our opinion that when there is an allegation that the testator had
a fixed intention to make a bequest in favor of the plaintiff and there existed
a strong probability that this intention would have been carried out but for
the wrongful acts of the defendant there exists a cause of action.”).
246. See Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v. Ichthus
Cmty. Tr., 780 S.E.2d 311, 319–20 (Ga. 2015) (recognizing a cause of action
for “tortious interference with a gift”); see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 29
(noting that courts have permitted plaintiffs to bring tortious interference
claims “in conjunction with a will contest” based on a decedent’s inter vivos
transfers induced by a tortfeasor) (citing Estate of Jeziorski, 516 N.E.2d 422,
426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)); Johnson, supra note 9, at 777–78 (discussing cases
that involved deprivation of “of a true inter vivos gift” before the major
decision in Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2002)).
247. See Orr, supra note 89, at 764–65 (describing “alleged wrongful
lifetime transfers that remove property from a decedent’s probate estate” as a
circumstance in which probate relief would be inadequate). The Supreme
Court of Illinois similarly described the situation as follows:
[A] will contest would not have provided sufficient relief to
[plaintiff/appellant] because it would not have extended to the
alleged inter vivos transfers of property. [Plaintiff/Appellant] alleged
that [tortfeasor] depleted [donor’s] estate by inducing her to transfer
assets worth more than $1 million to him prior to her death. In a
successful will contest, [plaintiff/appellant] could have recovered only
assets that were part of the estate upon [donor’s] death but could not
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Court of Florida rejected the application of tortious interference, it
noted that: “[i]f defendant’s tortious conduct had caused the
testator to make an inter vivos conveyance to defendant of assets
that would otherwise have been part of the estate, setting aside
the will would be inappropriate redress and consequently a tort
action is properly allowed.”248
In conclusion, while Maine is admittedly alone on the
“frontier” of tortious interference jurisprudence in allowing the
tort action to proceed prior to the death of a testator,249 decisions
concerning inter vivos conveyances lay the groundwork for the
concept that the wrongful conduct may occur prior to the testator’s
death and that the harm may be “complete” prior to probating the
relevant will. Practical considerations of the benefits
of
proceeding in tort before, rather than after, the testator dies may
ultimately convince other courts to join Maine in its flexible
approach.
IV. RHODE ISLAND AND TORTIOUS INTERFEERENCE WITH AN EXPECTED
INHERITANCE

A.

Americans United for Life v. Legion of Christ of North
America, Inc.

In a ground breaking decision, the Rhode Island Superior
Court recently acknowledged the viability of Tortious Interference
in Rhode Island in the case of Americans United for Life v. Legion
of Christ of North America, Inc.250 The decision followed the
court’s previous dismissal of a case brought against the Legion of
Christ by Mary Lou Dauray, the niece of the decedent (Gabrielle
Mee) whom the Legion allegedly defrauded and unduly influenced
have reached the assets transferred during her lifetime.
In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 243 (Ill. 2009) (emphasis added).
248. DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1981) (citing Hegarty v.
Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mass. 1943)); Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013 (Me.
1979)); see also Johnson, supra note 9, at 781 (providing example of an
expectancy “[r]educed or [d]efeated by a [t]ortiously [i]nduced [i]nter [v]ivos
[d]iminution of the [t]estator’s [p]robate [e]state,” i.e. pre-death inter vivos
conveyances).
249. Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1021; but see Carlton, 575 So. 2d at 241
(indicating that Florida may offer recognition under certain limited
circumstances).
250.
Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No.
PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 13, 15–16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017).
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to give it her vast fortune.251 Both the case brought by Dauray
and the case brought by Americans United for Life (Americans
United) alleged the same facts, explained below.
Throughout her lifetime, Mrs. Gabrielle Mee was a devout,
pious, and conservative Catholic.252 In 1950 she wed Timothy
Mee.253 The two donated generously and copiously to religious
and secular charities throughout their thirty-five year
marriage.254 In 1989, a few years after Mr. Mee’s death, Mrs. Mee
was introduced to Father Marcial Maciel, the founder of the
Legion of Christ, a Catholic order comprised of priests and
seminarians.255 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mee made a gift of
$1,000,000 to the Legion.256 Mrs. Mee quickly became
the
Legion’s devoted disciple.257 Father Maciel, whom Mrs. Mee came
to view as a saint, wrote to her frequently, encouraging her to
make further gifts, and telling her how proud Mr. Mee would be of
her for donating to the Legion.258 At Father Maciel’s personal
invitation, Mrs. Mee traveled abroad with him on official Legion
business.259 Father Maciel also included Mrs. Mee specifically in
his prayers at mass and fast-tracked her to the status of
“consecrated woman” in Regnum Christi, a reclusive and
cloistered subsidiary order of the Legion.260 After moving into a
Regnum Christi facility in Smithfield, Rhode Island, Mrs. Mee’s
contact with family and friends was monitored, controlled, and in
many instances prevented.261 Her access to news media was also
obstructed at times.262
Meanwhile, at the urging of Father Maciel and other Legion
251. Dauray v. Estate of Mee, Nos. PB 10-1195, PB 11-2640, PB 11-2757,
2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2012).
252. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 2; Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS
141, at *2.
253. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *3.
254. See id. at *3–4.
255. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 5.
256. Id.
257. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *6–7.
258. Id. at *33–34, 43.
259. Id. at *33.
260. Id. at *21, 26; Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 5.
261. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *23, 27; Ams. United for
Life, slip op. at 5.
262. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *23, 27; Ams. United for
Life, slip op. at 5–6.
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priests, Mrs. Mee continued to gift $60,000,000 of her fortune,
through lifetime gifts, trusts, and testamentary instruments, to
the Legion: in 1991, Mrs. Mee made a gift of $3,000,000 to the
Legion and created a will, leaving ninety percent of her assets to
the Legion and ten percent to Americans United.263 In 1995, Mrs.
Mee executed a codicil to her 1991 will which revoked her gift to
Americans United and made the Legion sole beneficiary.264
In 1996, the Legion offered to pledge Mrs. Mee’s assets to
negotiate a $25 million loan from Fleet Bank (now Bank of
America) to purchase a seminary facility in Thornwood, New York
(the Thornwood Loan).265 In 2000, counsel for the Legion drafted,
and Mrs. Mee executed, a broad power of attorney in favor of
Father Bannon, effectively giving the Legion full control over Mrs.
Mee’s finances, and a new will, leaving all of Mrs. Mee’s assets to
the Legion and appointing Father Bannon as the executor of her
estate.266 And in March 2001, the Legion and Mrs. Mee together
brought suit against Fleet, after it refused to terminate Mrs. Mee’s
Revocable Trust and distribute the principal from that trust and
Mr. Mee’s Charitable Foundation to the Legion in order to
discharge the Thornwood Loan.267 The case was eventually
settled, and Mrs. Mee’s Revocable Trust was liquidated to pay the
Thornwood Loan.268
Americans United alleged that Mrs. Mee was insulated from
information that her beloved spiritual advisor, Father Maciel, was
a fraud and inveterate criminal, and “led a sordid life,” which most
certainly would have impacted her continued giving.269 Despite
maintaining an image as a celibate and saintly priest, Father
Maciel “was, among other things, a serial sexual abuser”; he had
engaged in relationships with several women, fathered children,
two of whom he is alleged to have molested, and sexually abused
teenaged seminarians.270
263. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *2, 5–6; Ams. United for
Life, slip op. at 3.
264. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *8; Ams. United for Life, slip
op. at 3.
265. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *37.
266. Id. at *9, 23, 27.
267. Id. at *9–10.
268. Id.
269. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 6.
270. Id.; see Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *10–12.
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In 1997, the Hartford Courant published an article describing
some of Father Maciel’s actions, including “misuse of prescription
drugs, financial impropriety, and other allegations.”271 Per the
article, “nine men accused Father Maciel of sexually abusing them
from the 1940s to 1960s.”272 Americans United alleged that
Legion officials covered up the scandal and kept this information
from Mrs. Mee.273
Americans United claimed that by 2006, high-ranking Legion
officials knew about Father Maciel’s relationships, children, and
sexual abuse and made a pact to protect Father Maciel and keep
the information secret.274 It further alleged that the information
was kept from Mrs. Mee even when, later in 2006, the Vatican
issued a Communiqué inviting Father Maciel “to a reserved life of
penitence and prayer, relinquishing any form of public
ministry.”275
Mrs. Mee died on May 16, 2008, at the age of ninety-six.276
The Legion publicly acknowledged that Father Maciel had a
daughter in February 2009, nine months after Mrs. Mee’s death
and more than a year after Father Maciel’s death.277 In May
2010, the Vatican released a “scathing report regarding [Father
Maciel’s] gross misconduct.”278
Americans United received notice of its interest in Mrs. Mee’s
estate in December 2013.279 It thereafter moved to intervene in
litigation brought by Ms. Dauray, after the case had been
dismissed on summary judgment for lack of standing and
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.280 The Supreme
Court denied Americans United’s appeal.281 About one month
after the Executor closed Mrs. Mee’s Estate, Americans United
271. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *8 (citation omitted).
272. Id.
273. See Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 6, 8–9.
274. Complaint ¶ 68, Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N.
Am., Inc., C.A. No. PC-2016-2900 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016).
275. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *10–11.
276. Id. at *16.
277. See Complaint ¶¶ 90–116, Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of
Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. PC-2016-2900 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016).
278. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 6.
279. Id. at 20.
280. Id.; see Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *38
281. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 20.
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petitioned to reopen, alleging that the Legion was guilty of unduly
influencing and defrauding Mrs. Mee.282 The probate court
denied the petition and the superior court affirmed on appeal.283
Americans United then brought a separate and independent
action against the Legion, alleging fraud, undue
influence,
tortious interference, civil conspiracy, and sought a constructive
trust.284 Americans United claimed that Father Maciel and other
Legion officials systematically preyed upon Mrs. Mee, taking
advantage of her piety to manipulate her and strip her of her
fortune.285 Americans United further claimed that Mrs. Mee
never learned the truth about Father Maciel or the Legion of
Christ before her death on May 16, 2008, and that she never
would have gifted to the Legion had she known about Father
Maciel’s gross misconduct.286
The Legion of Christ moved to dismiss Americans United’s
suit.287 Much of the briefing and oral argument was dedicated to
Americans United’s claim of tortious interference, an area that the
court labeled “thought-provoking.”288 In deciding the Legion’s
motion, the court first considered whether recognition of the tort
constituted creation of a new cause of action, which can only occur
in extreme circumstances absent a legislative remedy, or whether
it constituted mere extension of the existing common-law cause of
action, tortious interference with contractual relations.289
Americans United argued that many other jurisdictions had
extended the cause of action for tortious interference with contract
rights or business relations to cover tortious interference with an
inheritance or gift,290 and that Rhode Island has long recognized a
cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights or
other business relations.291 The court agreed and further cited
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 2, 7.
285. See id. at 6.
286. Complaint ¶¶ 87–89, Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of
N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. PC-2016-2900 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016); see Ams.
United for Life, slip op. at 6.
287. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 1–2.
288. Id. at 11.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202, 206 (Or. 1999);
Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1979).
291. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 13–14; see, e.g., Jolicoeur Furniture
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Comment a of Section 774B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which provides that “tortious interference with expectation of
inheritance ‘represents an extension to a type of noncontractual
relation of the principle found in the liability for intentional
interference with prospective contracts stated in [Section]
766B.’”292
In response to the Legion of Christ’s argument that
recognition of tortious interference would interfere with Rhode
Island’s “comprehensive statutory scheme designed to secure the
expeditious and conclusive settlement of estates and quieting of
titles,”293 the court held that “[a] tort claim does not become a will
contest simply because it arises out of the facts relating to the
making or unmaking of a will.”294 On the contrary, the court
explained:
A successful tort action results in a judgment against the
defendant for money damages, not a determination of the
validity of a particular will or other testamentary result.
The legal differences between a will contest and the tort
are far-reaching. The tort, an action at law, allows
compensatory and punitive damages.295
The focus in an action alleging tortious interference is on the
plaintiff’s injury, rather than the testator’s intent. Moreover,
while a probate proceeding is an in rem proceeding which
“determines what will happen to the assets in the testator’s
probate estate,” a tort action can result in a judgment against an
individual, “to be paid from that individual’s personal assets.”296
Thus, the court held, a claim for tortious interference is distinct
from a will contest and does not interfere with the expeditious and
conclusive settlement of estates and quieting of titles.297
The court next considered the Legion of Christ’s argument
Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 751–52 (R.I. 1995); Belliveau Building Corp. v.
O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 624, 626–27 (R.I. 2000).
292. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 15 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
293. Id. at 16 (quoting Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir.
2006)).
294. Id. at 16 (quoting Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 204 (Or. 1999)).
295. Id. (quoting Munn v. Briggs, 185 Cal. App. 4th 578, 586–87 (2010)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 16.
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that such an action “would not lie where an adequate statutory
remedy is available but has not been pursued.”298 While the court
agreed that no claim for tortious interference would lie where
there is an adequate alternate statutory remedy, it found that the
circumstances presented in Umsted v. Umsted299 and Henry v.
Sheffield,300 both of which dismissed claims for the plaintiffs’
failure to pursue adequate statutory remedies, were inapplicable
to Americans United for two reasons.301 First, Americans
United’s motion to intervene in the Dauray litigation and its
petition to reopen Mrs. Mee’s estate were denied.302 Thus,
Americans United did, however unsuccessfully, pursue a
remedy.303 Furthermore, under Rhode Island General Laws
Section 33-18-17, allowing a “person legally interested in the
estate of a deceased person . . . to recover any property, personal
or real . . . [that] should be recovered for the benefit of the estate,”
which could have been pursued against the Legion of Christ in
superior court, did not provide Americans United with an
adequate remedy, as Americans United was not “legally
interested,” and, even if it were such action, if successful, would
ultimately enrich the estate, of which the Legion of Christ was the
sole beneficiary.304 Second, the court determined that Americans
United sufficiently pled the elements of tortious interference,
though it left “for another day a discussion of the precise elements
required to prove a claim of tortious interference with expectation
of inheritance.”305
B. The Future of the Tort in Rhode Island
1.

Viability

The Rhode Island Superior Court’s recognition of tortious
interference with an expected inheritance sets a new legal
298.
2012)).
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
2006)).
305.

Id. at 17 (quoting Henry v. Sheffield, 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (D.R.I.
446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006).
856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (D.R.I. 2012).
Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 19–21.
Id. at 20.
See id.
Id. at 18 (quoting Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir.
Id. at 22.
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precedent in Rhode Island. Whether the Rhode Island Supreme
Court will agree with the superior court’s decision remains to be
seen. However, there are several arguments that support
recognition of the tort in Rhode Island.
As explained in Part II, supra, many other jurisdictions that
have considered tortious interference have extended the cause of
action for tortious interference with contract rights or business
relations to cover tortious interference with an inheritance or
gift.306 Rhode Island has long recognized a cause of action for
tortious interference with contract rights or other business
relations.307 Both tortious interference with an
expected
inheritance and other tortious interference claims involve: 1)
economic loss without physical harm to person or property; 2) a
claim that is not based on an existing and enforceable right or an
existing and enforceable contract; and 3) a probable prospect of
economic gain.308 Thus, Rhode Island already recognizes liability
for similar tortious conduct.309 Moreover, Rhode Island courts
frequently look to the Restatement in determining the scope and
applicability of tort law in the State, which officially recognized
the tort in 1979.310 Thus, if history is any indicator, other Rhode
306. See, e.g., Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 204 (Or. 1999); Cyr v. Cote, 396
A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1979).
307. See, e.g., Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 624 (R.I.
2000); Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 753 (R.I. 1995).
308. Allen, 974 P.2d at 202; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 450
(2000).
309. Simply extending the concept of tortious interference to cover
situations in which a tortfeasor impermissibly interferes with a right to
inherit does not usurp the powers of the General Assembly. Rhode Island
courts have previously extended existing causes of action to new contexts.
See, e.g., Central Falls Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. Central Falls Teachers Union,
C.A. No. PC 2014-6275, 2015 R.I. Super. LEXIS 110, at *25 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Aug. 28, 2015) (extending the principle that public employers cannot divest
themselves of statutory duties to the educational context); Bibeault v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 317, 319 (R.I. 1980) (With “the absence of a
legislative intent to the contrary” the Rhode Island Supreme Court extended
the well-established duty of an insurer in the context of liability insurance to
act reasonably and in good faith in settling third-party claims against
insureds to the context of an “insurer’s bad faith refusal to settle an
insurance claim . . . .”).
310. See, e.g., Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1257–58 (R.I. 2012)
(relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315); Volpe v. Gallagher,
821 A.2d 699, 706 (R.I. 2003) (relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 318); Clift v. Narragansett TV L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 810 (R.I. 1996)

1_MURPHY&CLARKE_FINAL EDIT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/19/17 6:21 AM

580 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:531
Island judges will likely agree with the Americans United court.
As the Americans United court pointed out, recognition of
tortious interference does not undermine Rhode Island’s policy of
“expeditious and conclusive settlement of estates and quieting of
titles” as it is an in personam action, completely distinct from a
will contest or an action under Rhode Island General Laws
Section 33-18-17 to recover assets for the benefit of the estate.311
It seeks damages from the defendant, rather than to revoke
probate of a will or otherwise interfere with probate assets. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
explained, “[d]espite its entwinement with probate, a cause of
action for tortious interference with inheritance is one brought in
personam. It is no different from any other tort—the plaintiff is
asserting that some tortious action on the part of the defendant
has caused him or her damage.”312
The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District,
explained that “[t]he legal differences between a will contest and
[tortious interference] are far-reaching.”313 Indeed, “[u]nlike
(relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455); Shire Corp. v. R.I.
Dep’t of Transp., C.A. No. PB 09-5686, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at
*89 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2012) (relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 766, 766A which concerns tortious interference with a business
relationship).
311. Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No.
PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (quoting Umsted v.
Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006)); see Munn v. Briggs, 185 Cal. App.
4th 578, 586 (Cal. App. 2010) (whereas a probate proceeding determines what
will happen to the testator’s probate estate, a tort action can result in a
judgment against the defendant personally).
312. Golden v. Golden, 382 F.3d 348, 364 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Marshall
v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 296, 312 (2006) (probate exception inapplicable to
plaintiff’s claim of tortious interference, as plaintiff was “seek[ing] an in
personam judgment . . . not the probate or annulment of a will”); Bouchard v.
Bouchard, 382 A.2d 810, 814 (R.I. 1978) (explaining that in rem jurisdiction
is jurisdiction over the thing, while in personam jurisdiction is jurisdiction
over the person); Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (whereas a probate
proceeding determines what will happen to the testator’s probate estate, a
tort action can result in a judgment against the defendant personally); Burt
v. Rhode Island Hosp. Tr., C.A. No. PC/02-2243, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91,
at *26 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jul. 26, 2006) (“[T]he damages remedy sought is
entirely distinct from the probate res, and the plaintiffs’ suit is, therefore,
cognizable in the Superior Court.”).
313. Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (quotations omitted) (Tortious
interference “is not a testator-centered remedy . . . the tort represents a
fundamental and significant shift of focus away from the testator and onto
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probate proceedings, which seek to carry out the intent of the
testator with respect to the distribution of the testator’s estate, a
tort action for interference with an expected inheritance
endeavors to restore the plaintiff with the benefit arguably lost
because of the defendant’s tortious conduct.”314 Moreover, the fact
that a plaintiff’s damages may be measured, in part, by the
amount of the inheritance they would have received, but for the
interference “does not convert [its] tort claims into an action to
probate a will or administer an estate.”315 In fact, courts can
grant relief, without “challenging the [probate court’s]
determinations of estate value and testamentary document
validity, enforceability and distributive scheme.”316 Thus,
litigation of a claim for tortious interference would not hamper the
probate process or the settlement of estates.
2.

Exhaustion Requirement

The Americans United court, following Umsted and Henry,317
found that “a claim for tortious interference with expectation of
inheritance is unavailable when an adequate statutory remedy
was available but not pursued.”318 This “exhaustion” requirement
appears to be a reconciliation of two competing interests: 1)
preventing attempts to circumvent the probate court statutes and
2) assuring a plaintiff an avenue to redress damages caused by
tortious conduct. However, in Rhode Island, such a requirement
the wronged would-be-beneficiary.”) (emphasis added); accord In re Estate of
Ellis, 923 N.E.2d. 237, 240 (Ill. 2009) (“A tort action for intentional
interference with inheritance is distinct from a petition to contest the validity
of a will, in several important respects.”); Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1017
(Me. 1979) (“[W]e find the distinction between a will case and the instant suit
significant and . . . conclude that such differences entitled plaintiffs to a jury
trial. . . .”).
314. Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted).
315. Wellin v. Wellin, No. 2:14-cv-4-67-DCN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19488, at *30 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2015).
316. Golden, 382 F.3d at 364; see also Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (“A
successful tort action results in a judgment against the defendant for money
damages, not a determination of the validity of a particular will or
testamentary result.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
317. Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006); Henry v.
Sheffield, 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (D.R.I. 2012).
318. Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No.
PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 19 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (citing Umsted, 446
F.3d at 22).
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is burdensome, highly impractical, and potentially impossible to
satisfy.
First, adoption of the probate exhaustion requirement would,
in many cases, limit victims to the probate court forum,
contravening well-settled case law that tortious interference may
be entertained by non-probate courts, based on a logical reading of
federal authority construing the federal probate exception.319 In
Marshall v. Marshall (the Anna Nicole Smith litigation), the
decedent’s widow brought a claim against the decedent’s son
alleging that the son had tortiously interfered with a gift she
expected to receive from the decedent.320 The decedent’s son
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claiming
that the widow’s claim could only be tried in the Texas probate
court system.321 The son’s motion was granted and the decedent’s
widow appealed.322 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
noted that many federal courts, citing the probate exception, had
incorrectly abstained from adjudicating matters that extend “well
beyond probate of a will or administration of a decedent’s estate,”
including an executor’s breach of fiduciary duty.323 While the
probate exception does prevent federal courts from disposing of
property in the custody of a state probate court, “it does not bar
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines
and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.”324 Importantly, the
Court stated that “[s]tate probate courts possess no ‘special
proficiency . . . in handling [such] issues.”325
319. The probate exception has been defined to mean that “a federal court
has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate,” hence the
“exception” to federal court jurisdiction. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494
(1946).
320. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 296, 300–01 (2006).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 304.
323. Id. at 311.
324. Id. at 312.
325. Id. at 312 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704
(1992)). The Marshall Court also classified tortious interference as a
transitory action. Id. at 313–14. Rhode Island courts have held that a
transitory action:
[I]s one that can be brought in any venue where the defendant can
be personally served with process. Transitory actions are universally
founded on the supposed violation of rights which, in contemplation
of the law, have no locality. Thus, a transitory action exists as
opposed to a local action, which is one that can be brought only in
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Though the probate exception is a federal doctrine affecting
federal courts, the Rhode Island Superior Court in Burt v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust compared the doctrine to the jurisdiction of
Rhode Island probate courts.326 In Burt, the plaintiffs filed a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the co-executors of the
decedent’s estate in superior court while estate proceedings in
probate court were ongoing.327 The Burt court found that the
plaintiffs’ claim “d[id] not involve the administration of an estate,
the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter.”328
Significantly, the plaintiffs were seeking an in personam
judgment against the executors, such that the damages sought
were distinct from the res being administered by the probate
court.329
It is thus clear that the Rhode Island Superior Court has the
jurisdiction and capacity to entertain claims for tortious
interference. By contrast, Rhode Island probate courts may
exercise jurisdiction only to the limited extent conferred by statute
and have very limited equitable powers.330 Specifically, Rhode
Island probate courts may only follow the course of equity as it
concerns a trust created by will or a testamentary trust.331 In
essence, Rhode Island probate courts have the power to
administer estates, not decide questions of law or impose
the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose, as when the action’s
subject matter is a piece of real property.
Aquidneck Realty, Inc. v. G.P. Pier Retail, LLC, C.A. No. NC-2007-0625, 2008
R.I. Super. LEXIS 22, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2008) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 34 (8th ed. 2004) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotations
omitted)). The Marshall Court held that, “a State cannot create a transitory
cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that
transitory cause of action in any court having jurisdiction.” 547 U.S. at 314.
326. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-9-9 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.); C.A. No. PC/02-2243, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91, at
*26 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2006).
327. C.A. No. PC/02-2243, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91, at *9–10.
328. Id. at *24 (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall, 547 U.S. at 304)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
329. Id. at *25–26.
330. Id. at *17 ((“[P]robate courts in Rhode Island are courts of limited
jurisdiction and can ‘exercis[e] jurisdiction only in a manner and to the extent
conferred by statute’” (alteration in original) (quoting Carr v. Prader, 715
A.2d 291, 293 (R.I. 1999)).
331. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-2-13 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of
the Jan. 2016 Sess.).
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equitable remedies. Thus, a claim of tortious interference, which
is of both an equitable and legal character, is incapable of
adjudication by the probate court.332 And because the elements
comprising a claim of tortious interference cannot be adjudicated
by the Rhode Island probate courts, adoption of the exhaustion
requirement in Rhode Island would actually impede tort victims’
ability to obtain redress for their damages.
Other nearby states seem to agree. Maine has a probate court
system similar to that of Rhode Island, making its jurisprudence
on the exhaustion requirement compelling.333 Recognizing the
limited jurisdiction of their probate courts and the unavailability
of jury trials at the probate court level, Maine state courts have
held that there is no requirement for victims of tortious
interference to exhaust probate court remedies before bringing
such a claim in superior court.334
As described in Part III, in Plimpton v. Gerrard, the plaintiff,
son of the decedent, brought an action against defendant legatee
of a will alleging tortious interference with his expectancy, both in
connection with the inter vivos transfer of his parents’ real estate,
and in connection with the revision of his father’s will.335 The
defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims, arguing that the
plaintiff had an obligation “to exhaust his Probate Court
332. See Bosworth v. Bosworth, 167 A. 151, 152 (R.I. 1933) (fraud is “one
of the principal grounds of equitable jurisdiction.”); Champlin v. Slocum, 103
A. 706, 708 (R.I. 1918) (the court of probate, which has no equity jurisdiction,
is not adapted to the investigation and determination of questions of fraud);
Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1019 (Me. 1979) (undue influence is the means of
the tortious interference); Paiva v. Paiva, PC 05-3039, 2008 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 48, at *21–22 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2008) (undue influence is
constructive fraud); accord Gee v. Bullock, C.A. No. 96-2223, 1996 WL
937009, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 1996) (“Allegations of
misrepresentation are one of the principal grounds for obtaining equitable
jurisdiction in Superior Court.”); see generally Burt v. Rhode Island Hosp. Tr.,
C.A. No. PC/02-2243, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91, at *18 n.9 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Jul. 26, 2006) (claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, like fraud, are not
appropriate for resolution by the probate court).
333. See Voisine v. Tomlinson, 955 A.2d 748, 751 (Me. 2008). Moreover,
Maine has a significant body of law on the tort. “Nine decisions by Maine’s
Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) between 1979 and 2000 have clarified the
elements and scope of the tort in Maine, and several subsequent Superior
Court cases have further applied it.” Klein, supra note 13, at 252.
334. Cyr, 396 A.2d at 1017; Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 887 (Me.
1995).
335. Plimpton, 668 A.2d at 884.

1_MURPHY&CLARKE_FINAL EDIT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/19/17 6:21 AM

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE & INHERITANCE

585

remedies,” both in connection with the inter vivos transfer
challenge and the plaintiff’s claim relating to the inheritance of
his father’s estate in probate court.336 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine disagreed. Though the plaintiff “theoretically
[had] an adequate remedy in the Probate Court” for his inter vivos
transfer challenge and inheritance claim, it did “not compel [him]
to go there to pursue his tortious interference claim.”337 The court
reasoned that the superior court and the probate court had
concurrent jurisdiction for a claim of undue influence. “The very
concept of concurrent jurisdiction is inconsistent with a preference
for one jurisdiction over another.”338 Moreover, and importantly,
“[i]n civil cases in which damages are sought, a plaintiff has the
right to a jury trial.”339
Connecticut, similarly, limits the jurisdiction of its probate
courts. Connecticut General Statutes Section 45a-98 defines the
“[g]eneral powers” of the probate courts, contrasting them with
the superior courts of “general jurisdiction.”340 Connecticut courts
recognize that probate courts are limited.341 Importantly, the
Connecticut Appeals Court has held that counts for “tortious
interference with the expectation of an inheritance,” among other
torts, were not within the jurisdiction of the probate court, stating
that “[n]either [Section] 45a-98 [which sets out the jurisdiction of
336. Id. at 886–87.
337. Id. at 887.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-98 (Westlaw through the 2016 Sept. Spec.
Sess.).
341. See Heussner v. Hayes, 961 A.2d 365, 369 (Conn. 2008) (“The Probate
Court is a court of limited jurisdiction prescribed by statute, and it may
exercise only such powers as are necessary to the performance of its duties.”);
Heiser v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co., 192 A.2d 44, 45 (Conn. 1963) (“It is a familiar
principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is
without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances
and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation. . . .
Our courts of probate have a limited jurisdiction and can exercise only such
powers as are conferred on them by statute . . . .”) (emphasis added); Geremia
v. Geremia, 125 A.3d 549, 561 (Conn. App. 2015) (“Connecticut law long has
demarcated the distinction between the jurisdiction of our probate and
superior courts. Connecticut General Statutes § 51-164s provides in relevant
part that ‘[t]he Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction
for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate
have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute. . . .’”).
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the probate court] nor any other provision of the General Statutes
vests the Probate Court with jurisdiction, exclusive or otherwise,
over those actions sounding in tort.”342
Other states with probate courts jurisdictionally unable to
entertain a claim for money damages arising for allegations of
fraud hold that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to pursue
remedies there prior to filing a suit in the trial courts.343 In
Widdig v. Watkins, the daughter of a decedent filed claims for civil
fraud, undue influence, and tortious interference against her niece
and nephew.344 The trial court granted the niece and nephew’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding
that the daughter had an obligation to exhaust her probate court
remedies. Reversing, the appellate court explained that a
threshold issue is “whether appellant had an appropriate
procedure available in probate court to redress her claims . . . .”345
Explaining that the probate court “is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction,” the court upheld the daughter’s claims, brought in
her individual capacity, as “generally speaking, the probate
division has no jurisdiction over claims for money damages arising
from allegations of fraud.”346 Thus, the daughter had no
obligation to pursue probate court remedies before filing her
claims in the trial court.347
Though New Hampshire has not yet recognized tortious
interference, its case law indicates that if it did, probate
exhaustion would not be a prerequisite to maintaining a suit in
342. Geremia, 125 A.3d at 561.
343. See, e.g., Widdig v. Watkins, No. 13-CA-3531, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS
4015, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2013).
344. Id. at *1–2.
345. Id. at *5.
346. Id. at *8.
347. Id.; see also Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 1991) (“[W]e
do not believe the same evidence supports the will contest and the action for
intentional interference with a bequest. Further, we agree with plaintiffs that
a complete remedy could not be provided in the will contest because of the
additional costs involved in the appeals process.”); Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d
199, 204 (Or. 1999) (“A tort claim does not become a will contest simply
because it arises out of facts relating to the making or unmaking of a will.”);
Butcher v. McClain, 260 P.2d 611, 616 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Allen and
concluding plaintiff was not required to bring claim in probate court to
pursue tort); Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E. 260, 264 (W. Va. 1982) (“We find
tortious interference with a testamentary bequest to be a tort in West
Virginia. This tort is not within probate court jurisdiction . . . .”).

1_MURPHY&CLARKE_FINAL EDIT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/19/17 6:21 AM

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE & INHERITANCE

587

the superior court. Similar to Rhode Island, the New Hampshire
probate courts are “not [ ] court[s] of general jurisdiction. [Their]
powers are limited to those conferred upon [them] by statute.”348
In In re CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire stated that, in enacting the Omnibus Justice Act, the
legislature “did not intend to force a party entitled to a jury trial
in superior court to first subject itself to a trial before a probate
court judge and then to appeal an adverse decision to the superior
court for jury trial.”349 Specifically, the “statutory provision that
the superior court will take ‘cognizance’ of matters in the probate
court for which there is a right to trial by jury did not deprive
litigants of the right to apply for relief in superior court without
first applying for the same relief in the probate court.”350
States that have adopted the exhaustion requirement, on the
other hand, have probate court systems that are much better
suited to adjudication of a tort such as tortious interference. For
instance, Massachusetts, which espouses the exhaustion
requirement, has probate “courts of general equity jurisdiction,”
which sit full-time.351 Furthermore, Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 215, Section 2, provides that Massachusetts probate
courts are courts of “superior and general jurisdiction.”352 Thus, it
is possible for the Massachusetts probate courts to adjudicate
claims of tortious interference, making circumvention of the
probate court procedures a legitimate concern.
As is clear, Rhode Island probate courts are ill equipped, and
more importantly lack the necessary jurisdiction, to adjudicate a
claim for tortious interference. However, there is another
compelling rationale for rejection of an exhaustion requirement:
the practical limitations of the Rhode Island probate court system
itself. There are thirty-nine probate courts in Rhode Island—one
for each town or city.353 Probate judges sit part-time and often
348. In re Estate of O’Dwyer, 605, A.2d 216, 217 (N.H. 1992).
349. 177 A.2d 884, 890 (N.H. 2001).
350. Id.
351. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 6 (Westlaw through Ch.1 of the 2017 1st
Annual Sess.).
352. Id. § 2.
353. See Probate Courts: State Links, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Special-Jurisdiction/Probate-Courts/State-Links.
aspx#Rhode Island (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). Many of these courts meet
only once per month. See Rhode Island Probate Court Update,

1_MURPHY&CLARKE_FINAL EDIT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/19/17 6:21 AM

588 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:531
maintain private law practices. Moreover, while the Rhode Island
Rules of Civil Procedure are self-executing in superior court, in
the probate courts parties must petition, pursuant to Rhode Island
General Laws Sections 8-9-17 and 9-18-12, for the use of specific
discovery to obtain information from the opposing party.354 A
probate court may then exercise its discretion and “limit the scope
of discovery to what is relevant to the contested issue before it and
may shorten or enlarge deadlines for compliance as circumstances
warrant.”355 With respect to hearings, probate courts may choose
whether to apply the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the parties can decide jointly whether to apply the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence.356 Decisions are always rendered by a probate
court judge, never a jury, and parties advancing in age do not have
the benefit of acceleration of civil actions in cases where a
“plaintiff or defendant has attained the age of sixty-five (65)
years.”357
A claim of tortious interference involves allegations of undue
influence, fraud or duress, and oftentimes is proven by
circumstantial evidence, as “the perpetrator of such covert
coercion generally applies the forbidden pressure in secret.”358
Discovering such indirect evidence would be an awkward and
clumsy task in probate court, where use of discovery devices is not
automatic, and petitioning for discovery may involve waiting a
month until the court next meets. Moreover, whether one has
been unduly influenced or defrauded is frequently a fact-intensive
inquiry that is more appropriate for resolution by a jury, rather
than a judge. Because the circumstantial evidence likely involves
out of court statements, it is imperative that the rules of evidence
apply. For these and other reasons, the Rhode Island probate
court system is an inappropriate forum to bring a claim of tortious
PROVIDENCERI.COM, http://www.providenceri.com/efile/620 (last visited Mar.
4, 2017).
354. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-9-17 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of
the Jan. 2016 Sess.); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-18-12 (West, Westlaw through
Ch. 542 of the Jan. 2016 Sess.).
355. 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-22-19.2(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch.
542 of the Jan. 2016 Sess.).
356. Id.
357. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-2-18 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of
the Jan. 2016 Sess.).
358. Caranci v. Howard, 708 A.2d 1321, 1324 (R.I. 1998).
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interference.
An understanding of the limited jurisdiction and functionality
of the probate court system in Rhode Island demonstrates that
concerns about circumvention of the probate court statutes are not
implicated by rejection of the exhaustion requirement. Indeed,
there is no real ability to litigate a claim of tortious interference in
the Rhode Island probate courts, rendering an exhaustion
requirement meaningless and, potentially, fatal to a tort victim’s
ability to obtain constitutionally guaranteed relief.
Thus,
whatever the force of arguments in favor of exhaustion as
necessary prior step to bringing a claim of tortious interference,
the practical effects of such a requirement in Rhode Island must
be carefully weighed, considered, and given context. These
authors believe that the potential benefits of such a requirement
in Rhode Island are far outweighed by the risk of closing the
courthouse doors to victims of the tort.
CONCLUSION

Decades of case law illustrate that courts recognize the need
to fill the vacuum left by the inadequacy of probate court
procedures by extending the common-law claim for tortious
interference with a business relation or contract to the context of
inheritance law. The Rhode Island Superior Court’s decision in
Americans United for Life v. Legion of Christ of North America,
Inc. aligns Rhode Island with several states, including nearby
Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, and, by threatening to
penalize wrongdoing, promises to deter those who would attempt
to tortiously interfere with a testator’s intentions. Americans
United, therefore, represents a significant victory for the Rhode
Island population vulnerable to undue influence and fraud and for
third parties who have been thereby deprived of their inheritance.

